Importance of Indo-US Nuke Deal :

The agreement for the Indo-US nuke deal was reached between Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh and US president Mr. George W. Bush on July 18,2005 during Dr. SIngh's State visit to the US.Later on March 2, 2006,the deal was clinched when Mr. Bush visited India.Since then, it has been awaiting Congressional approval.The basic objective of the deal is to allow the US to have civilian nuclear trade and technology with India besides blazing the trail for the international community to have nuclear cooperation with the country.

Indicating a paradigm shift in the existing legal status of the American nuclear policy, the bill allow US civillian nuclear trade even with those countries which have not allowed full international inspectons.The bipartisan support to the deal came in the wake of the Senate's rejection of the "killer"amendments, including the one seeking mandatory commitment on India's part to stop making fissile material and another one , enjoining upon India to snap off millitary ties with Iran.

How historical is the Indo-US agreement signed by Manmohan Singh and US President Bush in July 2005? What are its implications of this understanding, especially its nuclear aspects? Does it affect the autonomy of India's nuclear decision-making? The deal on nuclear energy - is that all that India wanted? Even if this was wanted, was this the right way to obtain it? Are there any unwritten understandings between the two countries, especially vis-?-vis China? These are important questions.

TheAmerican compulsionsunderlying the Indo-US agreement are: First, the US wishes to remould the political architecture of Asia; China is an important state for the US to balance against Japan and India. Second, India is the future third largest economy in the world and the US would like to access this huge market. Third, India is the largest credible democracy in the world. Condoleezza Rice had stated that the US would like to see India as a 'major world power'.

India's compulsions are as follows: First, India understands that the US occupies the apex of world power in its political, military, economic and cultural dimensions. Second, India needs the US to access high technology, especially relating to defence and nuclear energy.

The Indo-US agreement states that India is a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, an euphemism for a nuclear weapon state, which could be equally applied to Israel, but, hopefully, not to Pakistan. However, the members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) do not consider India as a NWS or a non-NWS. Moreover, there are many "ifs" in the understanding. obal diplomatic front.Many, both inside and outside the government have reasoned that this understanding gets India out of its present international isolation. One needs to examine how India got into this state of isolation in the first place. India's nuclear programme has been limping along for the last four decades due to confusion in objectives. Since the civilian programme was used to achieve military objectives, there is no separate military programme; hence the difficulty today in separating civilian from military activities. India's efforts to disguise its military programme within its civilian started this confusion.

India's peaceful nuclear explosions were premature; India fudged and argued that PNEs were permitted under the NPT; Raja Ramanna confessed at a later stage that there is no technical difference between a nuclear explosion for civilian or military purposes. Pokharan I was a pointless exercise. Whether the 1998 tests were necessary for strategic reasons is arguable.

What are the present problems? First, plutonium from power reactors can be used for nuclear devices, but is required in larger quantities to make them. Greater skill is also required to construct nuclear devices out of reactor grade plutonium; therefore all three plutonium reprocessing plants in Tarapur, Trombay and Kalpakkam would need to be kept out of safeguards. Similarly, CIRUS and Dhruva, capable of producing weapons grade plutonium, would also need to be kept out of the safeguards regime. Second, developing a triad is visualized by the nuclear doctrine that would require newer design warheads and their miniaturization. The sea-based deterrent cannot be credibly developed without testing. Otherwise, India would have to scale down its nuclear ambitions to target Pakistan, but not emulate China. Third, natural uranium is being rapidly depleted as the Jharuguda mines only had around 10,000 tonnes of workable ores. Commercially viable mines in India's northeast and Andhra Pradesh have not been exploited due to local opposition. Lack of natural uranium will slow down India's nuclear power programme, based on pressurized heavy water reactors. The prototype fast breeder reactor in Kalpakkam would require highly enriched uranium. Little is known about India's enrichment programme, which has been kept under wraps by the Atomic Energy Commission.

Finally, would Dr Manmohan Singh be able to deliver on his promises in the light of opposition from the Left parties? Would Mr Bush be able to deliver, as the anti-proliferation lobby in the US is gearing itself up for battle in Congress? Other NSG countries would also have domestic problems in helping India, which is hoping that Russia and France would break ranks and supply the needed uranium.

The agreement is historic and should be welcomed. It is a triumph of Indian diplomacy. What would the NSG provide? Whatever is provided would be a gain for India. The real problem now is drawing a fence between the civilian and military programmes. Would this affect India's national security? All civilian and military programmes starts with uranium and its availability is a problem for India. Getting uranium from outside would be essential for India.

Converting thorium to uranium through fast breeder reactors would become controversial. Since India could have the access to uranium, there may be questions about why India needs fast breeder reactors? Many questioned Iran why it wants nuclear energy, when its needs could be met by gas?

It is not difficult to conclude what India wants. What Dhruva and Cyrus have produced is enough. They are already producing enough to make ten weapons in a year, and in the next ten years India could have more than 100 weapons. What India needs to do is define its needs and objectives.

Comments

•  The Indo-US agreement is a win-win for both countries, though many fear that it would cap India's nuclear programme. India should not worry about China; the US is building India as a balancer to China.
  

•  The US has agreed to work with India on nuclear issues, because India is a country that is easy to work with, besides being a responsible state and a democracy. The US President is determined to work the agreement and has always been able to get what he wants from the US Congress.
  

•  The nuclear aspects of the understanding mean that the impediments to the civilian programme are being removed. However there are dangers of nuclear safety and security, which should not be under estimated.
  

•  The US as the big brother has decided to help India; this would help France and Russia to help India on nuclear energy.
  

•  NSG and MTCR are not multilateral agreements but they are plurilateral. In Libya and North Korea, what the world is witnessing is plurilateral and not multilateral engagement. Security Council has always been bypassed on such crucial matters.
  

•  Why should India not gang up against China? China has always ganged up against India along with Pakistan.
  

•  Separation of civilian and military programmes will enhance India's deterrence capability. This would also help India to increase transparency and heighten the interaction between the military and civilian structures in India.
  

•  There have been remarkable shifts relating to Indo-US relations taking place during the Bush administration. Though there are chances of a breach in its international obligations this suits Indian interests. Certainly are domestic laws that the US would have to adjust, but the Bush administration has the ability to do this. There would not be many problems with the NSG. Russia and France would help India in any eventuality. India needs to be clear and transparent about what it wants.
  

•  India's Leftist parties cannot be underestimated. The young communist leaders are a force to be reckoned with.

Final Comments:

In 1998, India declared that its atomic energy programme did not need any external support and that it could do on its own. Even in 1974, there were such beliefs. But now, the time has come to take new decisions. There is an energy crisis looming ahead of India. There is also a realization now that the US is the pre-eminent power and has the nuclear technology, as if it was not before. India wanted to be a great power, through nuclear weapons.

During Nehru's period, there was not much of nationalization. India let the private firms to operate; but then it was not sufficient to meet India's energy requirements. India then went to Russia. It was during the same time, India wanted to be a great technological power. India then also wanted to become a nuclear weapons power, so that the international community could and ask India to be a part of the UNSC. It was during this period, India lost its vision, only to realize now that it needs energy. Why did India suddenly realize that we need nuclear energy? The US seems to have taken India into its objectives. India has not sold itself, but seems to have been observed by the US and the former is getting adjusted to it. Perhaps, Pakistan would also do the same thing in the near future.

Savita Soni

Courtesy : civilserviceindia.com