Sample Material of UPSC Mains Philosophy (Optional) Study Kit

Topic: Indian Philosophy (The Sankara School of Vedanta )

Comprehension of the philosophical Issues more essential than the Dialectic of controversy

PRAMZNA in Sanskrit signifies the means and the movement by which knowledge is acquired, pramdtd means the subject or the knower who cognizes, pramd the result of pramana right knowledge, prameya the object of knowedge, and prdmdnya the validity of knowledge acquired. The validity of knowledge is sometimes used in the sense of the faithfulness of knowledge to its object, and sometimes in the sense of an inner notion of validity in the mind of the subject the knower (that his percep tions are true), which moves him to work in accordance with his perceptions to adapt himself to his environment for the attainment of pleasurable and the avoidance of painful things. The question wherein consists the pramanya of knowledge has not only an epistemological and psychological bearing but a metaphysical one also. It contains on one side a theory of know ledge based on an analysis of psychological experience, and on the other indicates a metaphysical situation consistent with the theory of knowledge. All the different schools tried to justify a theory of knowledge by an appeal to the analysis and inter pretation of experience which the others sometimes ignored or sometimes regarded as unimportant. The thinkers of different schools were accustomed often to meet together and defeat one another in actual debates, and the result of these debates was fre quently very important in determining the prestige of any school of thought. If a Buddhist for example could defeat a great Nyaya or Mimamsa thinker in a great public debate attended by many learned scholars from different parts of the country, his fame at once spread all over the country and he could probably secure a large number of followers on the spot. Extensive tours of disputa tion were often undertaken by great masters all over the country for the purpose of defeating the teachers of the opposite schools and of securing adherents to their own. These debates were there fore not generally conducted merely in a passionless philosophical mood with the object of arriving at the truth but in order to inflict a defeat on opponents and to establish the ascendency of some particular school of thought. It was often a sense of personal victory and of the victory of the school of thought to which the debater adhered that led him to pursue the debate. Advanced Sanskrit philosophical works give us a picture of the attitude of mind of these debaters and we find that most of these debates attempt to criticize the different schools of thinkers by exposing their inconsistencies and self-contradictions by close dialectical reasoning, anticipating the answers of the opponent, asking him to define his statements, and ultimately proving that his theory was inconsistent, led to contradictions, and was opposed to the testimony of experience. In reading an advanced work on Indian philosophy in the original, a student has to pass through an interminable series of dialectic arguments, and negative criticisms (to thwart opponents) sometimes called vitandd, before he can come to the root of the quarrel, the real philosophical diver gence. All the resources of the arts of controversy find full play for silencing the opponent before the final philosophical answer is given. But to a modern student of philosophy, who belongs to no party and is consequently indifferent to the respective victory of either side, the most important thing is the comprehension of the different aspects from which the problem of the theory of knowledge and its associated metaphysical theory was looked at by the philosophers, and also a clear understanding of the de ficiency of each view, the value of the mutual criticisms, the specu lations on the experience of each school, their analysis, and their net contribution to philosophy. With Vedanta we come to an end of the present volume, and it may not be out of place here to make a brief survey of the main conflicting theories from the point of view of the theory of knowledge, in order to indicate the position of the Vedanta of the arikara school in the field of Indian philosophy so far as we have traversed it. I shall there fore now try to lay before my readers the solution of the theory of knowledge (pramdnavdda) reached by some of the main schools of thought. Their relations to the solution offered by the arikara Vedanta will also be dealt with, as we shall attempt to sketch the views of the Vedanta later on in this chapter.

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The Saiikara School of Vedanta The philosophical situation A Review

Before dealing with the Vedanta system it seems advisable to review the general attitude of the schools already discussed to the main philosophical and epistemological questions which de termine the position of the Vedanta as taught by Sarikara and his school.

The Sautrantika Buddhist says that in all his affairs man is concerned with the fulfilment of his ends and desires (purusdrtha). This however cannot be done without right knowledge (samyag- jndna) which rightly represents things to men. Knowledge is said to be right when we can get things just as we perceived them. So far as mere representation or illumination of objects is con cerned, it is a patent fact that we all have knowledge, and therefore this does not deserve criticism or examination. Our enquiry about knowledge is thus restricted to its aspect of later verification or contradiction in experience, for we are all concerned to know how far our perceptions of things which invariably precede all our actions can be trusted as rightly indicating what we want to get in our practical experience (arthaprdpakatva). The perception is right (abhrdnta non-illusory) when following its representation we can get in the external world such things as were represented by it (samvddakatva\ That perception alone can be right which is generated by the object and not merely supplied by our imagina tion. When I say “ this is the cow I had seen,” what I see is the object with the brown colour, horns, feet, etc., but the fact that this is Cetlled cow, or that this is existing from a past time, is not perceived by the visual sense, as this is not generated by the visual object. For all things are momentary, and that which I see now never existed before so as to be invested with this or that permanent name. This association of name and per manence to objects perceived is called kalpand or abhildpa. Our perception is correct only so far as it is without the abhilapa association (kalpandpodfia), for though this is taken as a part of our perceptual experience it is not derived from the object, and hence its association with the object is an evident error. The object as unassociated with name the nirvikalpa is thus what is perceived. As a result of the pratyaksa the manovijflana or thought and mental perception of pleasure and pain is also determined. At one moment perception reveals the object as an object of knowledge (grdhya), and by the fact of the rise of such a percept, at another moment it appears as a thing realizable or attainable in the external world. The special features of the object undefinable in themselves as being what they are in themselves (svalaksana) are what is actually perceived (j>ra- tyaksavisaya) . The pramdnaphala (result of perception) is the ideational concept and power that such knowledge has of showing the means which being followed the thing can be got (yena krtena arthah prapito bhavati}. Pramana then is the similarity of the knowledge with the object by which it is generated, by which we assure ourselves that this is our knowledge of the object as it is perceived, and are thus led to attain it by practical experience. Yet this later stage is pramanaphala and not pramana which consists merely in the vision of the thing (devoid of other asso ciations), and which determines the attitude of the perceiver to wards the perceived object. The pramana therefore only refers to the newly-acquired knowledge (anadhigatddhigantr) as this is of use to the perceiver in determining his relations with the ob jective world. This account of perception leaves out the real epistemological question as to how the knowledge is generated by the external world, or what it is in itself. It only looks to the correctness or faithfulness of the perception to the object and its value for us in the practical realization of our ends. The question of the relation of the external world with knowledge as determining the latter is regarded as unimportant.

The Yogacharas or idealistic Buddhists take their cue from the above-mentioned Sautrantika Buddhists, and say that since we can come into touch with knowledge and knowledge alone, what is the use of admitting an external world of objects as the data of sensation determining our knowledge ? You say that sensations are copies of the external world, but why should you say that they copy, and not that they alone exist? We never come into touch with objects in themselves ; these can only be grasped by us simultaneously with knowledge of them, they must there fore be the same as knowledge (sahopalambhaniyamdt abhedo nllataddhiyoh) ; for it is in and through knowledge that ex ternal objects can appear to us, and without knowledge we are not in touch with the so-called external objects. So it is knowledge which is self-apparent in itself, that projects itself in such a manner as to appear as referring to other external ob jects. We all acknowledge that in dreams there are no ex ternal objects, but even there we have knowledge. The question why then if there are no external objects, there should be so much diversity in the forms of knowledge, is not better solved by the assumption of an external world ; for in such an assump tion, the external objects have to be admitted as possessing the infinitely diverse powers of diversely affecting and determining our knowledge ; that being so, it may rather be said that in the beginningless series of flowing knowledge, preceding know ledge-moments by virtue of their inherent specific qualities de termine the succeeding knowledge-moments. Thus knowledge alone exists; the projection of ap external word is an illusion of knowledge brought about by beginningless potencies of desire (vdsana) associated with it. The preceding knowledge determines the succeeding one and that another and so on. Knowledge, pleasure, pain, etc. are not qualities requiring a permanent entity as soul in which they may inhere, but are the various forms in which knowledge appears. Even the cognition, “I perceive a blue thing,” is but a form of knowledge, and this is often errone ously interpreted as referring to a permanent knower. Though the cognitions are all passing and momentary, yet so long as the series continues to be the same, as in the case of one person, say Devadatta, the phenomena of memory, recognition, etc. can happen in the succeeding moments, for these are evidently illusory cognitions, so far as they refer to the permanence of the objects believed to have been perceived before, for things or know ledge-moments, whatever they may be, are destroyed the next moment after their birth. There is no permanent entity as per- ceiver or knower, but the knowledge-moments are at once the knowledge, the knower and the known. This thoroughgoing idealism brushes off all references to an objective field of ex perience, interprets the verdict of knowledge as involving a knower and the known as mere illusory appearance, and considers the flow of knowledge as a self-determining series in successive objective forms as the only truth. The Hindu schools of thought, Nyaya, Samkhya, and the Mlmamsa, accept the duality of soul and matter, and attempt to explain the relation between the two. With the Hindu writers it was not the practical utility of knowledge that was the only important thing, but the nature of knowledge and the manner in which it came into being were also enquired after and considered important.
Pramana is defined by Nyaya as the collocation of instruments by which unerring and indubitable knowledge comes into being. The collocation of instruments which brings about definite know ledge consists partly of consciousness (bodha) and partly of ma terial factors (bodhdbodhasvabhdvd). Thus in perception the proper contact of the visual sense with the object (e.g. jug) first brings about a non-intelligent, non-apprehensible indeterminate consciousness (nirvikalpa) as the jugness (gttatatva) and this later on combining with the remaining other collocations of sense- contact etc. produces the determinate consciousness: this is a jug. The existence of this indeterminate state of consciousness as a factor in bringing about the determinate consciousness, cannot of course be perceived, but its existence can be inferred from the fact that if the perceiver were not already in possession of the qualifying factor (visesanajndna as jugness) he could not have comprehended the qualified object (vtsistabuddhi) the jug (i.e. the object which possesses jugness). In inference (anumdna) knowledge of the liriga takes part, and in upamana the sight of similarity with other material conglomerations. In the case of the Buddhists knowledge itself was regarded as pramana; even by those who admitted the existence of the objective world, right knowledge was called pramana, because it was of the same form as the external objects it represented, and it was by the form of the knowledge (e.g. blue) that we could apprehend that the external object was also blue. Knowledge does not determine the external world but simply enforces our convictions about the ex ternal world. So far as knowledge leads us to form our convictions of the external world it is pramana, and so far as it determines our attitude towards the external world it is pramanaphala. The question how knowledge is generated had little importance with them, but how with knowledge we could form convictions of the external world was the most important thing. Knowledge was called pramana, because it was the means by which we could form convictions (adhyavasdya) about the external world. Nyaya sought to answer the question how knowledge was generated in us, but could not understand that knowledge was not a mere phenomenon like any other objective phenomenon, but thought that though as a guna (quality) it was external like other gunas, yet it was associated with our self as a result of colloca tions like any other happening in the material world. Pramana does not necessarily bring to us new knowledge (anadhigatddhi- gantf) as the Buddhists demanded, but whensoever there were collocations of pramana, knowledge was produced, no matter whether the object was previously unknown or known. Even the knowledge of known things may be repeated if there be suitable collocations. Knowledge like any other physical effect is pro duced whenever the cause of it namely the pramana collocation is present. Categories which are merely mental such as class (sdmdnya), inherence (samavdya), etc., were considered as having as much independent existence as the atoms of the four elements. The phenomenon of the rise of knowledge in the soul was thus conceived to be as much a phenomenon as the turning of the colour of the jug by fire from black to red. The element of indeterminate consciousness was believed to be combining with the sense contact, the object, etc. to produce the determinate con sciousness. There was no other subtler form of movement than the molecular. Such a movement brought about by a certain collocation of things ended in a certain result (phala). Jftana (knowledge) was thus the result of certain united collocations (sdmagrT) and their movements (e.g. contact of manas with soul, of manas with the senses, of the senses with the object, etc.). This confusion renders it impossible to understand the real philo sophical distinction between knowledge and an external event of the objective world. Nyaya thus fails to explain the cause of the origin of knowledge, and its true relations with the objective world. Pleasure, pain, willing, etc. were regarded as qualities which belonged to the soul, and the soul itself was regarded as a qualitiless entity which could not be apprehended directly but was inferred as that in which the qualities of jftana, sukha (pleasure), etc. inhered. Qualities had independent existence as much as substances, but when any new substances were produced, the qualities rushed forward and inhered in them. It is very probable that in Nyaya the cultivation of the art of in ference was originally pre-eminent and metaphysics was deduced later by an application of the inferential method which gave the introspective method but little scope for its application, so that inference came in to explain even perception (e.g. this is a jug since it has jugness) and the testimony of personal psycho logical experience was taken only as a supplement to corroborate the results arrived at by inference and was not used to criticize it 1 . Samkhya understood the difference between knowledge and material events. But so far as knowledge consisted in being the copy of external things, it could not be absolutely different from the objects themselves ; it was even then an invisible translucent sort of thing, devoid of weight and grossness such as the external objects possessed. But the fact that it copies those gross objects makes it evident that knowledge had essentially the same sub stances though in a subtler form as that of which the objects were made. But though the matter of knowledge, which assumed the form of the objects with which it came in touch, was probably thus a subtler combination of the same elementary substances of which matter was made up, yet there was in it another ele ment, viz. intelligence, which at once distinguished it as utterly different from material combinations. This element of intel ligence is indeed different from the substances or content of the knowledge itself, for the element of intelligence is like a stationary light, “ the self,” which illuminates the crowding, bustling knowledge which is incessantly changing its form in accordance with the objects with which it comes in touch. This light of intelligence is the same that finds its manifestation in consciousness as the “I,” the changeless entity amidst all the fluctuations of the changeful procession of knowledge. How this element of light which is foreign to the substance of knowledge relates itself to knowledge, and how knowledge itself takes it up into itself and appears as conscious, is the most difficult point of the Samkhya epistemology and metaphysics. The substance of knowledge copies the external world, and this copy-shape of knowledge is again intelligized by the pure intelligence (purusa) when it appears as conscious. The forming of the buddhi-shape of knowledge is thus the pramana (instrument and process of knowledge) and the validity or invalidity of any of these shapes is criticized by the later shapes of knowledge and not by the external objects (svatah-pramdnya and svatah-aprdmdnya). The pramana however can lead to a prama or right knowledge only when it is intelligized by the purusa. The purusa comes in touch with buddhi not by the ordinary means of physical contact but by what may be called an inexplicable transcendental contact. It is the transcendental influence of purusa that sets in motion the original prakrti in Samkhya metaphysics, and it is the same transcendent touch (call it yogyata according to Vacaspati or samyoga according to Bhiksu) of the transcendent entity of purusa that transforms the non-intelligent states of buddhi into consciousness. The Vijftanavadin Buddhist did not make any distinction between the pure consciousness and its forms (akdra) and did not therefore agree that the akara of knowledge was due to its copying the objects. Samkhya was however a realist who admitted the external world and regarded the forms as all due to copying, all stamped as such upon a translucent sub stance (sattvd) which could assume the shape of the objects. But Samkhya was also transcendentalist in this, that it did not think like Nyaya that the akara of knowledge was all that know ledge had to show ; it held that there was a transcendent element which shone forth in knowledge and made it conscious. With Nyaya there was no distinction between the shaped buddhi and the intelligence, and that being so consciousness was almost like a physical event With Samkhya however so far as the content and the shape manifested in consciousness were concerned it was indeed a physical event, but so far as the pure intelligizing element of consciousness was concerned it was a wholly transcendent affair beyond the scope and province of physics. The rise of consciousness was thus at once both transcendent and physical.

The Mimamsist Prabhakara agreed with Nyaya in general as regards the way in which the objective world and sense con- tact induced knowledge in us. But it regarded knowledge as a unique phenomenon which at once revealed itself, the knower and the known. We are not concerned with physical colloca tions, for whatever these may be it is knowledge which reveals things the direct apprehension that should be called the pra- mana. Pramana in this sense is the same as pramiti or prama, the phenomenon of apprehension. Pramana may also indeed mean the collocations so far as they induce the prama. For prama or right knowledge is never produced, it always exists, but it manifests itself differently under different circumstances. The validity of knowledge means the conviction or the specific attitude that is generated in us with reference to the objective world. This validity is manifested with the rise of knowledge, and it does not await the verdict of any later experience in the objective field (samvddiri). Knowledge as nirvikalpa (indeter minate) means the whole knowledge of the object and not merely a non-sensible hypothetical indeterminate class-notion as Nyaya holds. The savikalpa (determinate) knowledge only re-establishes the knowledge thus formed by relating it with other objects as represented by memory.

Prabhakara rejected theSamkhya conception of a dual element in consciousness as involving a transcendent intelligence (cif) and a material part, the buddhi ; but it regarded consciousness as an unique thing which by itself in one flash represented both the knower and the known. The validity of knowledge did not depend upon its faithfulness in reproducing or indicating (pradarsakatva) external objects, but upon the force that all direct apprehension (anubkuti) has of prompting us to action in the external world ; knowledge is thus a complete and independent unit in all its self-revealing aspects. But what the knowledge was in itself apart from its self-revealing character Prabhakara did not enquire.

Kumarila declared that jnana (knowledge) was a movement brought about by the activity of the self which resulted in pro ducing consciousness (jndtata) of objective things. Jfiana itself cannot be perceived, but can only be inferred as the movement necessary for producing the jnatata or consciousness of things. Movement with Kumarila was not a mere atomic vibration, but was a non-sensuous transcendent operation of which vibration was sometimes the result. Jftana was a movement and not the result of causal operation as Nyaya supposed. Nyaya would not also admit any movement on the part of the self, but it would hold that when the self is possessed of certain qualities, such as desire, etc., it becomes an instrument for the accom plishment of a physical movement. Kumarila accords the same self-validity to knowledge that Prabhakara gives. Later know ledge by experience is not endowed with any special quality which should decide as to the validity of the knowledge of the previous moyement. For what is called samvadi or later testimony of experience is but later knowledge and nothing more 1 . The self is not revealed in the knowledge of external objects, but we can know it by a mental perception of self-consciousness. It is the movement of this self in presence of certain collocating cir cumstances leading to cognition of things that is called jnana a . Here Kumarila distinguishes knowledge as movement from know ledge as objective consciousness. Knowledge as movement was beyond sense perception and could only be inferred.

The idealistic tendency of Vijfianavada Buddhism, Samkhya, andMlmamsawas manifest in its attempt at establishing the unique character of knowledge as being that with which alone we are in touch. But Vijfianavada denied the external world, and thereby did violence to the testimony of knowledge. Samkhya admitted the external world but created a gulf between the content of know ledge and pure intelligence ; Prabhakara ignored this difference, and was satisfied with the introspective assertion that knowledge was such a unique thing that it revealed with itself, the knower and the known ; Kumarila however admitted a transcendent element of movement as being the cause of our objective consciousness, but regarded this as being separate from self. But the question remained unsolved as to why, in spite of the unique character of knowledge, knowledge could relate itself to the world of objects, how far the world of external objects or of knowledge could be regarded as absolutely true. Hitherto judgments were only re lative, either referring to one s being prompted to the objective world, to the faithfulness of the representation of objects, the suitability of fulfilling our requirements, or to verification by later uncontradicted experience. But no enquiry was made whether any absolute judgments about the ultimate truth of knowledge and matter could be made at all. That which appeared was re garded as the real. But the question was not asked, whether there was anything which could be regarded as absolute truth, the basis of all appearance, and the unchangeable reality. This philosophical enquiry had the most wonderful charm for the Hindu mind.

Vedanta Literature

It is difficult to ascertain the time when the Brahma-sutras were written, but since they contain a refutation of almost all the other Indian systems, even of the unyavada Buddhism (of course according to ankara s interpretation), they cannot have been written very early. I think it may not be far from the truth in supposing that they were written some time in the second century B.C. About the period 780 A.D. Gaudapada revived the monistic teaching of the Upanisads by his commentary on the Mandukya Upanisad in verse called Mdndukyakdrikd. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of Sankara (788 820 A.D.). ankara s com mentary on the Brahma-sutras is the root from which sprang forth a host of commentaries and studies on Vedantism of great originality, vigour, and philosophic insight. Thus Anandagiri, a disciple of Sankara, wrote a commentary called Nydyanirnaya, and Govindananda wrote another commentary named Ratna- prabhd. Vacaspati MiSra, who flourished about 841 A.D., wrote another commentary on it called the BhdmatL Amalananda (1247 I2OOA.D.) wrote his Kalpataru on it, and Apyayadlksita ( 1 5 50 A.D.) son of Rangarajadhvarlndra of Kaflcl wrote his Kalpa- taruparimala on the Kalpataru. Another disciple of Sankara, Padmapada, also called Sanandana, wrote a commentary on it known as PaHcapddikd. From the manner in which the book is begun one would expect that it was to be a running commentary on the whole of &ankara s bhasya, but it ends abruptly at the end of the fourth sutra. Madhava (1350), in his Sankaravijaya, recites an interesting story about it. He says that Surevara re ceived ankara s permission to write a vdrttika on the bhasya. But other pupils objected to Sankara that since Suresvara was formerly a great Mlmamsist(Mandana MiSra was called SureSvara after his conversion to Vedantism) he was not competent to write a good vdrttika on the bhasya. Suresvara, disappointed, wrote a treatise called Naiskarmyasiddhi. Padmapada wrote a tlka but this was burnt in his uncle s house. Sankara, who had once seen it, recited it from memory and Padmapada wrote it down. Prakasatman (1200) wrote a commentary on Padmapada s Pan- capddikd known as Pancapddikdvivarana. Akhandananda wrote his Tattvadipana, and the famous Nrsimhasrama Muni (1500) wrote his Vivaranabhdvaprakdsikd on it. Amalananda and Vidyasagara also wrote commentaries on Pancapddikd, named Pancapddikddarpana and Pancapddikdtikd respectively, but the Pancapddikdvivarana had by far the greatest reputation. Vidyaranya who is generally identified by some with Mad- hava (1350) wrote his famous work Vivaranaprameyasamgrahd 1 , elaborating the ideas of Pancapddikdvivarana ; Vidyaranya wrote also another excellent work named Jivanmuktiviveka on the Vedanta doctrine of emancipation. SuresVara s (8OOA.D.) excellent work Naiskarmyasiddhi is probably the earliest inde pendent treatise on arikara s philosophy as expressed in his bhasya. It has been commented upon by Jftanottama MiSra. Vidyaranya also wrote another work of great merit known as Paftcadast, which is a very popular and illuminating treatise in verse on Vedanta. Another important work written in verse on the main teachings of ankara s bhasya is Samksepasdriraka, written by Sarvajflatma Muni (CXX>A.D.). This has also been commented upon by Ramatlrtha. &rlharsa (IIQOA.D.) wrote his Khandanakhandakhddya, the most celebrated work on the Vedanta dialectic. Citsukha, who probably flourished shortly after riharsa, wrote a commentary on it, and also wrote an independent work on Vedanta dialectic known as Tattvadlpikd which has also a commentary called Nayanaprasddini written by Pratyagrupa. Sankara Misra and Raghunatha also wrote commentaries on Khandanakhandakhddya. A work on Ve danta epistemology and the principal topics of Vedanta of great originality and merit known as Veddntaparibhdsd was written by Dharmarajadhvarindra (about I55OA.D.). His son Ramakrsnadhvarin wrote his Sikhdmani on it and Amaradasa his Maniprabhd. The Veddntaparibhdsd with these two commen taries forms an excellent exposition of some of the fundamental principles of Vedanta. Another work of supreme importance

The Sahkara School of Vedanta

Though probably the last great work on Vedanta) is the Advaitasiddhi of Madhusudana SarasvatI who followed Dharma- rajadhvarlndra. This has three commentaries known as Gauda- brahmdnandl, Vitthalesopadhydyi and Siddhivydkhyd. Sadananda Vyasa wrote also a summary of it known as Advaitasiddhisid- dhdntasdra. Sadananda wrote also an excellent elementary work named Veddntasdra which has also two commentaries Subodhinl and Vidvanmanoranjini. ^hzAdvaitabrahmasiddhitf Sadananda Yati though much inferior to Advaitasiddhi is important, as it touches on many points of Vedanta interest which are not dealt with in other Vedanta works. The Nydyamakaranda of Ananda- bodha Bhattarakacaryya treats of the doctrines of illusion very well, as also some other important points of Vedanta interest. Veddntasiddhdntamuktdvall of Prakasananda discusses many of the subtle points regarding the nature of ajftana and its relations to cit, the doctrine of drstisrstivdda, etc., with great clearness. Siddhdntalesa by Apyayadlksita is very important as a summary of the divergent views of different writers on many points of interest. Veddntatattvadipikd and Siddhdntatattva are also good as well as deep in their general summary of the Vedanta system. Bhedadhikkdra of Nrsimhasrama Muni also is to be regarded as an important work on the Vedanta dialectic.

The above is only a list of some of the most important Ve danta works on which the present chapter has been based.

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