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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(Septembert-2017)- Good Urban Governance - Municipal Management Perspective


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Urban Development


Good Urban Governance - Municipal Management Perspective

The term or the concept of ‘Good Governance’ is not a new one. It is one of the basic concepts, which the human society has confronted with political discourse throughout the course of history. The discipline of political science has developed with the changing meaning of this concept. The present context of the term or concept of ‘Good Governance’ is quite different and much broader. It is shadowed and shaped by the process of globalization, economic liberalization and privatization.

The process of globalization, economic liberalization and privatization that world is witnessing since 1980 (in India since 1991) is bringing about landslide change in the philosophy behind the role of government, and in the relationship between the state and its citizens. Citizens are perceiving themselves more as consumers than a ‘subjects’ with respect to the government (State). Governance is increasingly being seen as a participatory and contractual process in which citizens wish to play a prominent role in designing, implementing and monitoring public policies. The fact that the productivity and well being of an individual now depends not only on his own talents and hard work, but also largely on the quality of governance and the quality of life made possible by the government is a new dimension acting heavily on the concept of ‘Good Governance’.

In this changing context, it has become increasingly necessary for the government to respond to the needs of its citizens, who are now to be looked upon as its customers, by measuring their responses to its initiatives. The government is, now expected and is actually forced to pursue ‘Good Governance’ based on objectives of transparency, accountability and efficiency for fulfilling its ultimate objective of the citizens’ welfare at large.

The case for ‘Good Governance’ is becoming stronger as the philosophy of governance is changing with the rise of expectations and competitiveness in society (especially in the urban society).

An urban local government (ULG) is a public institution concerned with community welfare, social justice and economic prosperity of its people. The urban local body is supposed to manage resources in public trust and (among all tiers of government) is closest to the people. These two aspects play a prime role in deciding the quality of the urban life and thereby the level of urban productivity. They make the three sutras of new millennium – accountability, transparency and efficiency, indispensable for the ‘Good Governance’ of urban local bodies. Thus by its very nature or by its constitution it has to be efficient, transparent and accountable to the public. The objective of ‘Good Governance’ is not only philosophically relevant but has become a compelling necessity for urban local bodies.

Though the philosophically relevant concept of ‘Good Urban Governance’ has become compelling necessity, in practice it has not taken firm root in ULGs of India. The Government of India launched this movement two years ago, but most of the State Governments and almost all ULGs have failed to take this movement forward. ‘Good Urban Governance’ is equated with the technology savvy cosmetic efforts like starting single window system or GIS based information center or automated voice response system or making some information or services available on web or internet or putting up hi-fi touch screen kiosk etc. Good urban governance should not be something external or cosmetic, it has to spring internally from every aspect of an ULG and needs to integrate into its culture.

This paper is broadly divided in the four parts – Part one attempts to describe the concepts of ‘Good Governance and Good Urban Governance’, while part two tries to outline the management and finance function perspective of ‘Good Urban Governance’. Part three of the paper examines management and finance function of Indian urban local government and enumerates how it fails to deliver ‘Good Urban Governance’. The last part of the paper enlists suggested municipal reforms from the management and finance function perspective for attaining ‘Good Urban Governance’.

Part I

Concept of ‘Good Governance’ and ‘Good Urban Governance

Governance is "the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a country's economic and social resources for development." For a city, governance is the exercise of power to manage a city's economic and social development.

Traditionally governance is equated to ‘everything that government does attain general welfare of the people. The present concept of governance is quite different and broader. Governance is now viewed as a broader notion than government. It involves governments (exercise of power) but also civil society (citizens, civic institutions, etc) and management of resources. When we talk about governance in the urban management context we are talking about all the formal and informal laws, regulations, frameworks, systems and processes that shape the way in which an urban local government operates.

The formal governance structures relate to the political and legal framework in which a city operates. The informal governance structure refers to behavior, systems and processes that have become part of the way the city does business through non legal (informal) influences such as culture, historical traditions, social norms, business practices etc.

From an urban local government perspective good governance means:

  • Involving the community in identifying their wants and needs - this implies that the city government will uphold democratic processes and be accountable to the people of the city
  • Developing policies and approaches to meet community needs with the involvement of the community in the process. (For example, involving the community in developing the strategic vision for the city)
  • Making sure that all levels of the government system understand their roles and responsibilities (and the community should also know what each level of government is responsible for)
  • Developing effective intergovernmental relationships
  • Ensuring that the allocation of resources across levels of government is fair and equitable
  • Encouraging innovative management that contributes to successful outcomes for the community
  • Determining ethical standards of behavior for those working within government (as politicians or administrators) and monitoring people's performance to make sure they do meet those standards.

A critical element of good governance at the urban local government level is the establishment of an inter-governmental institutional framework that:

  • Clearly specifies the responsibilities of each level of government
  • Provides the appropriate authority to support the delegated responsibilities
  • Specifies and enforces a code of conduct to underpin administration
  • Encourages private sector and civil actors to participate in development or management.

In addition, good urban governance requires:

  • A sound public - private partnership
  • Effective government and citizen interaction

Thus ‘Good Urban Governance’ refers to the legal, political and networking framework in which good management flourishes and in which public – private partnership and peoples participation has sufficient legitimate space. An urban local government is now required to perform both governance and management roles in partnership with private sector and civil societies (citizens, civil institutions) in order to attain good urban governance.

Part II

Municipal Management Perspective of Good Urban Governance

The modern concept of Good Governance (and of-course of good urban governance) is not confined only to improving the regulatory, maintenance and development function of a government. Besides this governing role, it includes a management (attaining goals by using resources efficiently and effectively) role, partnership with private institutions and participation of civil societies.
The concept of Good Governance essentially postulates that the government is an organization working in social ecology and is confronted by the problems of employing limited resources (four ‘M”s – man, machine, material and money and now information) judiciously to achieve maximum common goals and objectives. Thus the concept of good governance has, besides legal, political and social perspectives two additional perspectives - one, management perspective and two, peoples’ participation (private and civil institutions) perspective. Every endeavour to achieve good governance inevitably must have management and peoples’ participation perspective. This paper, as mentioned earlier, deals only with the management perspective of good governance.

The management improvement perspective of the good governance concept has not received due attention in India in all forms of government and governmental organizations. The management perspective (which includes the finance function) of good governance is much more relevant in case of urban local government than any other level of government. This is because of its pronounced dual character. Urban local government is not only a ‘miniature body politic’ but at the same time it is also a ‘body corporate’. It is this ‘body corporate’ character of an urban local government which makes management improvement perspective most essential for attaining good urban governance. Before we outline management perspective of good urban governance let us describe what term management and governance mean. How can they be separated to have focused attention? And what are the elements of good governance.

Management Role

  • Management is defined as the process that ensures the goals of an organization are achieved and resources are used efficiently and effectively. Good management involves:
  • Ensuring that the vision, goals and strategies for the organization are determined in consultation with key stakeholders and the governing body
  • Developing plans to ensure the vision, goals and strategies are achieved
  • Ensuring the objective consideration of options and choices; of advantages and disadvantages, costs and benefits and of risks
  • Effectively managing the resources of the organization (people, financial, physical) to achieve results
  • Monitoring the performance of the organization and of individuals
  • Adjusting strategy when the environment changes
  • Accepting responsibility for performance.

Good management requires a wide range of skills and abilities including:

  • The capacity to listen and learn from stakeholders and others
  • The ability to provide leadership and direction in the development and achievement of the vision
  • The ability to identify issues and solve problems
  • The capacity to effectively and efficiently utilize financial and physical resources to achieve objectives i.e. Using resources in a cost effective way to achieve the best results.
  • The ability to inspire, lead and manage people (including the ability to ensure staff have the appropriate skills, knowledge and attributes required to do their jobs effectively.)

Governance Role

Through community driven advocacy, strategy and policymaking and through the purchasing of products and services determined as part of the annual budget and plan, local governments exercise their power to manage the city's economic and social development i.e. Elected representatives perform their governance roles.

Through the delivery of quality services via contracts with public employees or private contractors and through the enforcement of regulations, local government management functions are performed by employees.

  • Specifically, governance roles include: Strategy setting - determining, with stakeholders, the longer term direction for the city including what services are a priority and what are not
  • Policy making - setting the framework for implementing the strategies (for example, the city may decide its policy on transport that is it will not provide buses; but it will support the private sector to establish an effective bus service through subsidies, licenses etc.
  • Defining service standards - this means deciding the level of service the city will provide - For example, will the city aim for a high cost air conditioned, frequent bus service or a low cost, basic bus type service
  • Monitoring the administration's effectiveness in delivering on the priority strategies and services
  • Assuring the provision of information to the community to enable the community to effectively participate in local government affairs.

The urban local government administration develops its strategies and policies based on the direction for the city set by the municipal council (usually determined by the political wing). The management role of local government thus lies in the service delivery and enforcement of regulations. Management roles are usually in:

  • Delivery of services - this means actually making sure the services are provided to the city either by public service provision or through private sector provision. For example, a city may decide it will not operate a bus system but will contract the private sector to deliver. The city will take on the role of defining exactly what is required of the private sector provider and select suitable providers based on their requirement. The city will monitor the performance of all service providers and intervene when there are problems.
  • Enforcement of regulations - cities usually have rules and regulations that they are required to administer and enforce. This may be in relation to building (permits to build, inspections to ensure quality etc) or parking rules or ……

Management's job is to ensure services are delivered in an efficient and effective way to the standard required.

Elements of good government –

These elements should be reflected in the governance and management structures and processes of the city. Good government requires

  • Accountability
  • Transparency
  • Contestability

Accountability – Accountability means decision makers accept responsibility for their decisions. Good governance and management requires clarity about where responsibilities lie. Accountability means having information available and processes applied so that those responsible for decision-making can be called to account for their decisions.

The hierarchy of accountability for local governments will usually be - the elected Mayor and Councilors are accountable to the public • the Municipal Commissioner is accountable to the Mayor and Councilors • Local government staff are responsible to the Municipal Commissioner. Being accountable means: • Articulating collective and individual responsibilities through plans and performance agreements • Reporting openly and honestly on progress against achievement of those plans and performance agreements using performance measurement of indicators • Being prepared to accept responsibility when things go wrong (it also means receiving recognition for success.)

Transparency - Transparency relies on a presumption of access to information about how the government works i.e. transparency means operating in a manner that is open, honest and amenable to questions, provided there is ready access to information...A transparent government is characterized by:

  • Public ability to influence decision processes
  • Public involvement on all plans and significant issues
  • The development of annual plans
  • Monitoring against agreed performance indicators
  • Separation of strategy, policy development, regulation setting and funding, from provision and enforcement.

Contestability - Contestability is about using competition to achieve value for money in service delivery. There is greater evidence to suggest that services provided by the public sector are more expensive than those provided by the private sector. There are many reasons for this. Sometimes it is because the public service is very inefficient; sometimes it is because the private sector has better access to technology or resources.

Whatever be the reasons, an ULG has a responsibility to ensure that services are provided in the most cost effective manner.

Contestability means choice in the provision of services through open competition between potential providers. This may compel an ULG to make a choice between public and private service provision. The outcome of contestability is more efficient use of community resources to deliver services required by the public. Contestability means

  • There is competitive bidding for delivery of services and functions to ensure services are delivered by the most efficient and effective means and to the standard required
  • Contracts are established between the purchaser of services (an ULG) and the deliverers of services i.e. business (public or private)
  • Creation of choices for communities for different kinds of local facilities and services through having a mixture of providers.
  • The above discussed management perspective of municipal reforms for good urban governance can be graphically presented as shown in Figure A. Let us now examine its functioning in the Indian urban local governments.

Part III

Management Function in Urban Local Governments

The management function described above constitutes ‘maintenance factor’ as defined in the ‘two factor theory of motivation’ in management science. This theory states that the presence of ‘maintenance factors’ of motivation does not bring great fortune or employee motivation but their absence brings disaster or great employee de-motivation to an organisation. Similarly absence of efficient management function in Indian urban local governments is really acting against the delivery of good urban governance to the people. The presence of efficient management function may not bring 100 per cent good urban governance but will certainly bring considerable good urban governance and more importantly lay foundation or pave way for other reforms like participation of people (private and civil institutions) to attain and to sustain good urban governance. In following passages an attempt is made to describe the present status of management function in Indian urban local governments and how it is hindering good urban governance.

Planning Function

The most basic and pervasive process of human activities, it refers to deciding in advance what actions to take and when and how to take them. It may be a shocking statement to say that there is almost absence of planning in Indian ULGs but it is true. How can a ULG having hundreds of employees and doing multiple of jobs be without a planning function? There does exist planning in ULGs but as a part of reactive or crisis management. What ULGs lack is proactive planning culture. Vision planning or strategic planning is almost absent and operational planning exists in a grossly inadequate manner in ULGs.

Usually one does not find a department, a section or a person in ULG responsible specifically for planning. Rarely one can find a ULG engaged in preparation of long-term or medium term physical planning of the city or a development planning for urban services or even maintenance planning for existing infrastructure or a man-power planning for ULG itself.

The proximity to the people and ever-changing day-to-day field situation has put ULGs into crisis management or reactive management mode and kept them away from planning. But precisely for these two reasons ULGs should have strong planning function as it can help them to plan routine works and be ready for exigencies or non-programmable activities.

In recent years some ULGs have shown recognition of planning aspects by getting urban services related technical master plans and in few cases even city development strategy from professional consultancy firms. This initiative has paid rich dividend to these ULGs. For example preparation of technical master plan for services development has helped ULGs of Ahmedabad, Surat and Vadodara to bring in focus in their infrastructure development. Still it cannot be said that planning has become integral part or culture of their management.

Organizing Function

Orgnising refers to the formal grouping of people and activities to facilitate achievement of the organizations objectives. It’s a vehicle to actualize plans prepared to attain common objectives. In ULGs this function is found inadequate and evolved in an unplanned manner as explained below.

Organisation structure refers to the specific manner in which people are grouped. Usually people are grouped on the basis of the various functions or geographical territories or by product or service lines etc. In ULGs it is possible to group people in different way but such grouping must have inherent logic. In most of the municipal bodies we find mixing up of various basis of structuring organization (grouping people). Another characteristic of municipal organization structure in ULGs is flatness, which means that it lacks various levels of management and has high degree of centralization. For example in Vadodara Municipal Corporation hardly 35 officers control an organization employing more than 11000 peoples. Similarly there is a high degree of centralization, for example in most of the ULGs no officer other than the chief accountant has powers to make payment. The flatness and centralization increases the span of management of municipal officers enormously. There is absence of clear unity of command and appropriate delegation of authority. For example the engineering, health and field level administrative departments handle the solid waste management function simultaneously in many ULGs.

Similarly in ULGs, which have gone for zonal administration (decentralization) the revenue function has become subject to ambiguous unity of command. All these problems associated with organizing are the direct outcome of the fact that organizing function in ULGs is an evolved one rather than structured or planned one. The net result is absence of an appropriate vehicle to carry forward concept of good urban governance.

Staffing Function

An organization may draw up any number of ambitious plans and may structure its organizing function logically and scientifically but if it does not have right kind of people, it can never succeed in implementing these plans. One of the biggest challenges is matching right people with the right jobs. ULGs traditionally suffer in this respect. There are several reasons for this Achilles’ heel of ULGs. To start with there does not exists formal defining of the job, then there was rampant nepotism in earlier days, even today the recruitment process is highly politicized. Most importantly the ULG jobs do not have social status and are on lowest preference scale of job aspirants. In earlier days and even today in case of many ULGs the employment or service terms are inferior compare to other governments and governmental form of organizations. The flatness of organsation structure has resulted in virtual absence of ‘vertical or upward movement motivation and the excessive job security associated with government job has put them beyond the operation of ‘positive and negative motivations‘. Motivation depends on several factors from physical working environment, design and content of work to relationship at work and freedom to experiment. All these factors have not been given any thought in ULGs. There is a total absence of capacity building concept; it is very common that a ULG employee retires after 30 years of service without getting single day formal training. Most of the ULGs do not have in house training facility. In simple words there is absence of concept of human resource development in most of the ULGs. Good governance has more do with mind set, attitude and culture of human element than any other thing like resources, technology etc. The underdeveloped and inappropriate human element of ULGs is considerably responsible for lack of good urban governance in India.

Decision Making Function

Underlying the processes of planning, controlling, organizing, staffing, and leading is the all-important process of decision-making. This function implies making rational choice between alternations. It involves defining the issue or situation, searching of alternative solutions, evaluation of alternatives, taking the decision and collecting feedbacks.

The legal structure of ULGs in India is such that policy-making powers are with the elected wing represented by the council and various committees made up of elected representatives, while executive powers or operational powers lie with the executive, which is represented by Municipal Commissioner. This separation of operational decisions with executive wing and policy decisions with elected wing has truncated the decision-making process and decapitated accountability for decisions made in ULGs. It has become conflict of human egos, reactive (as every body waits other wing to move first), long drawn and more importantly inconclusive. The quality of decision-making can be improved by using modern information technology but Indian ULGs have not harnessed this source. Non-existence of formal management information system is a common feature one can observe in ULGs. Good governance essentially requires quick, rational and conclusive decision-making but it is lacking in ULGs.

Finance Function

It involves the procurement of funds and their effective utilization in business. It covers financial planning, forecasting of cash receipts and disbursements, the realization and recovery of funds, allocation of funds, and utilization of funds in the best possible manner, and financial control. It deals with the three basic decisions - investment decision, financing decision, and dividend decision. These decisions are interrelated and hence, their joint impact must be taken into account. Management in this context means evolving optimal combination (mix) of these decisions to maximize the wealth of the firm.

Investment Decision - Capital budgeting, a major aspect of this decision, is the allocation of capital to investment proposals whose benefits are to be realized in future. It also includes decision to reallocate capital when an asset no longer economically justifies the capital committed to it. Efficient management of current assets, liquidity etc. also forms part of this area.

In ULGs this area of decision-making is much less than satisfactory. For example in ULGs allocation of resources (investment decision) to various activities is done in an adhoc manner. It lacks scientific project appraisal and selection procedure. As a result, resources are allocated to non-priority, non-essential or wasteful activities, while obligatory, essential works get neglected. ULGs are not only expected to attain the objective of maximizing the return but also the objectives of equity and social transformation (good urban governance). The defective functioning of the investment decision-making area has defeated this basic purpose and has drained ULGs resources through wasteful and non-priority expenditure.

Financing Decision - This is concerned with determining the best financing mix or capital structure for an organization. This involves deciding upon needs and sources of new external financing. Risk, return and control are the most crucial factors relevant in formulating the financing decision.

The financing decision area (resource augmentation) is a glaring failure of Indian ULGs. Indian ULGs have failed to optimize whatever tax resources they have. They have also failed to raise/develop non-tax resources. Similarly ULGs have failed to raise adequate loans from appropriate sources at minimum possible cost. This total failure of the financing decision-making area has left them too starved of resources to be able to go for good urban governance.

Dividend Decision - This area of decision-making includes the percentage of earnings paid to stockholders (citizens in case of governments), the stability of absolute dividends over time, stock dividends and the repurchase of stock. The value of a dividend (return) to the citizen must be balanced against the opportunity cost of the savings lost by way of tax payment to government.

The dividend decision area of the finance function is, many times, wrongly considered to be non-relevant for the ULGs. The term dividend should be understood in generic term - return. ULGs function using public money and they provide return to the people in the form of various urban services and social welfare activities. Thus the way a business enterprise strives to maximize the wealth of its shareholders, municipal bodies should also strive to maximize return or wealth to the citizens under its jurisdiction. Again this has not happen, like other governments, ULGs have provided negative rates of return to the people at large that is they have failed to provide good governance.

The finance function is an all-pervasive function and hence equally relevant for ULGs. Unfortunately since the working of its three constituent decision areas is defective, it is non-existent in all the ULGs. Other reasons for its non-existence in ULGs are described subsequently.

Absence of Scientific and Appropriate Accounting System - Accounting is recording, classifying and summarizing events & transactions in a meaningful manner and interpreting the results thereof. It is a process of identifying, measuring and communicating information to permit judgment and decision by the users of the accounts. As the accounting system is inadequate and defective, in ULGs it has becomes non-transparent not only to the outsiders but also to insiders who often happen to be decision makers, and incapable of identifying (or locating) accountability for inefficient performance. This lack of accountability and transparency is ultimately hindering good urban governance.

Inadequate Auditing - Auditing is a corollary to the accounting system. An independent, professional auditing system lends sanctity and credibility to the correctness and transparency of the accounts written. Auditing specifically serves the accountability objective as it unearths irregularities, lapses and inefficiencies and indicates persons and events accountable for them. The positive and constructive use of the auditing system ultimately helps management and stakeholders to spot and remove inefficiencies. Inadequate auditing has allowed inefficiency to perpetuate and thus indirectly hindered good urban governance.

Absence of Financial Reporting - Disclosure norms and financial reporting systems ensure presentation and dissemination of data, results of an organisation to the people at large in a transparent, comparable and user-friendly manner. An organisation may have a good accounting and auditing system but if the financial reporting system is inappropriate then it may not depict real picture of an organization’s performance. Thus it acts like a magnifying glass for the society at large, helping it to know about the efficiency with which an organisation has worked or served the society. It provides people with an information tool through which they can demand accountability for its performance. There is formal financial reporting system for ULGs; even most of the Municipal Acts are silent about it. The virtual absence of financial reporting standards and system has robbed people of an effective tool for pressing for good urban governance.

Unaugmented Budgeting System - Budgeting, in simple terms, is identifying what we want and devising ways to achieve it. Though historically it evolved as a controlling tool, today it is considered a very important management tool encompassing both planning and controlling functions. Budget in government (public institution) context is much more than tool for management. It is an instrument of socio-economic reforms. It is legal authorisation, a policy document, a financial plan, an operations guide, a communication device and basis for performance evaluation. The transparency about an organisation’s vision stems from the structure, format of its budget. The budget provides benchmarks for efficiency analysis and also provides modalities for fixing up accountability. In ULGs budgeting is a highly unaugmented, ritualistic and non-participative process. As any government gets actualized through the medium of budget, it has turned out to be biggest stumbling block in attaining good urban governance.

Controlling Function

Controlling provides a means of checking the progress of the plans and correcting any deviations that may occur along the way. Planning and controlling go hand to hand. It is difficult to conceive one without another. There can be no control without a plan and plans cannot be successfully implemented in the absence of control.

The type of control depends on factors to be measured and controlled. It is meaningful only when there is a clear-cut responsibility for activities and results. Like the other management functions, controlling is found wanting in the ULGs as follows.

Controlling requires standards for its operation and standards are established on the basis of plans. As plans are not made meticulously in ULGs it becomes difficult to set standards for performance. Having set standards it is necessary to devise a system of measuring the performance of individuals, and departments. ULGs have not developed performance indicators and they do not use any formal system to measure performance. The next aspect of controlling is correcting deviations, which depends on feedback. Feedback refers to the information about the critical control variable of the operations or activities. Usually ULGs do not have formal feedback system based on critical control variables of the activity.

The budget is a traditional and widely used control process but as noted above, it fails to work as a control devise in the ULGs. Recent years computer technology has made it possible to use sophisticated control techniques but as computerization level is still very minimal in ULGs, even this recourse is not used by ULGs for controlling.

The result of such a stark absence of controlling function is obvious. One finds cost and time overruns, lack of cost control, poor resources recovery performance etc in ULGs Not only this weak controlling remove the concept of accountability from the minds of people working in an organization. In the wake of weak controlling, it has become difficult to determine what is good urban governance for a particular ULG, how to measure it, and how far the actual performance is deviating from the standard.

The above discussion regarding the status of management function in the ULGs clearly indicates that each and every aspect of management function in ULGs is ridden with deficiencies, neglect and non-augmentation. Without strengthening it or making it efficient and effective it will not be possible to have good urban governance. Good urban governance is not something external or cosmetic, it has to spring internally from every aspect of an ULG. It needs to become integrated into the culture of an ULG. Starting single window system or holding ‘Lok Darbar at regular intervals or automated voice response system or making some information or services available on web or internet or putting up hi-fi touch screen kiosk etc do not necessarily lead to good urban governance, but is unfortunately being equated to those. These things do have relevance and role to play but they can do real quality addition to governance only if its core full of accountability, transparency and efficiency. As noted earlier management function is the basis, foundation, or ‘maintenance factor’ of good urban governance and until and unless it exists in the ULGs in an efficient, effective form, the good urban governance will remain an elusive mirage. In the next part of the paper an attempt is made to outline municipal reforms pertaining to management and financial systems to make good urban governance possible.

Part IV

Municipal Management Reforms for Good Urban Governance

The reforms enumerated in following pages pertain to the strengthening of the management function in ULGs to attain good urban governance. It is difficult to prioritise these reforms, as all of these are basic or fundamental, and have already become overdue. Ideally an ULG should adopt all of them simultaneously at a one go, but that seems impossible. An ULG striving to deliver good urban governance should select some of these reforms based on its own perception of situation, requirements, resources available and commitment. It can be observed that most of the reforms suggested are simple and mainly pertain t to attitudinal change and common sense at the institutional level. They do not require sophisticated technology, sizeable financial resources or professional support. What is most important is to get started with the reforms process (instilling willingness to reform) and to go on expanding its scope and composition as an ULG moves forward on the path of reforms. The municipal reforms for good urban governance can be enumerated as follows –

Separate Governance and Management Functions

Because of considering an ULG a miniature body politic till date, attention has been paid to its governance role only, but an ULG is a body corporate also. It is necessary to separate management function from governance function so that adequate attention can be paid to it.

Benefits of separating governance and management functions –

Some argue that there is little to be gained by separating the roles of governance and management. However it is experienced that separation of the two functions will contribute to more effective city management. The benefits of separating the two roles are hereby enlisted:

  • The political objectives and goals for the city are clearly defined (by the politicians)
  • Politicians are free to concentrate on policy and performance and can hold the City Manager accountable for effective achievement of objectives
  • The administrative goals and objectives for the city are clearly defined
  • Management of the organization is professionalized, to usher in higher standards of performance
  • Accountability is enhanced at all levels because the public knows who is responsible and for what
  • The risk of corruption and manipulation of the rules is reduced because the public knows exactly what each office bearer (political or administrative) should be doing
  • Objective policy advice can be given by the Municipal Commissioner with options and trade offs transparent
  • There will be less volatile changes in standards of service provision at times of change in political control.

Introduce Planning Function

The heading may appear surprising and trivial, but, as observed above, ULGs are devoid of a planning culture. They should introduce an appropriate planning function in each and every aspect of governance and inculcate an appropriate planning culture. For achieving good urban governance, introduction of planning function will not be sufficient, unless it is made real participative. 74th CAA has provided one way in the form of ward or circle committees. Beside this medium an ULG should explore all possible ways to involve people in its long and medium term planning process. The specific municipal reforms under this head would be –

  • Preparation of long-term vision plan for the city with the involvement of all its stakeholders. This exercise is also known as city development strategy or city corporate plan. It should be updated at a regular time intervals.
  • All the plans to be linked with each other.
  • Preparation of capital investment plan based on vision or city development strategy.
  • Preparation of financial and operational plan for implementing capital investment plan.
  • Beside such long and medium term strategy plans ULG should prepare detailed operational plans each and every important aspects of urban governance-management. For example vehicle replacement plan, manpower recruitment plan, assets maintenance plan etc.

Rationalize Organising Function

Organising is a vehicle or medium through which plans get actualized. ULGs will have to tune and tone up various apparatus of its organizing function. More specifically an ULG should undertake the following reforms -

  • Restructure and rationalize organization structure to make it logical. An ULG may choose any factor for such grouping but once it is selected there should be no mess up; only the logical structure should prevail.
  • Increase levels of management that is reduce existing flatness. This will reduce span of control and would also address the vertical motivation problem to some extent.
  • Review of jobs and responsibilities carried by different organizational positions and the authority delegated to them. On basis of such evaluation adequate delegation of authority should be carried out.
  • Establishing clear unity of command by removing overlapping jurisdictions of organizational positions. Organizational structure should evolve out of a well thought out exercise, rather than by default or accident.

Develop Human Resource

It is the human element, which ultimately carries out plans and controls by using the organization structure. It communicates with the world. Good governance is ultimately rendering satisfaction to the people at large and it refers to the mutual interaction of different human elements. Beside specific municipal reforms listed below regarding staffing function, good urban governance will really require attitudinal change or change of mindset of the people working in an ULG. For this appropriate capacity building and attitudinal transformation, efforts will have to be taken on a sustained basis, and an accountability fixing mechanism, to which even a common man can contribute to catch errant ULG employees, will have to be put in practice. The other specific municipal reforms should include -

  • Professionalised recruitment procedure. Recently Vadodara Municipal Corporation carried out its recruitment through professional agencies or two years back Government of Gujarat recruited municipal chief officers through GPSC.
  • Measures to create social credibility to municipal jobs.
  • Introduction of merit based promotion policy and creating adequate levels in management to facilitate upward mobility.
  • Infrastructure to conduct different types of training – induction, refresher, technical beside above discussed attitudinal training.
  • ULGs should improve physical and social work environment, relationships at work and culture of freedom.
  • Creation of a platform for sharing of experience, knowledge and innovations. City Managers Association, which started in Gujarat and now getting replicated in nine other states is a step in right direction. It has tried to fill the void but such efforts should be complemented further.
  • The political and more importantly executive leadership will have to become decisive and ready to shoulder responsibility. The exemplary experience of Surat, Ahmedabad, Thane and Nagpur testify to the tremendous potential of decisive and responsible leadership to gain unprecedented achievement from the very same municipal employees.

Decision-Making Function

  • The decision-making process in ULGs needs overhauling. The present legal structure separating policy making and operational or executive decision-making should undergo an urgent change. The present structure has given rise to the syndrome of authority without accountability. The Mayor-in-council format has worked successfully in some ULGs. It should be adopted widely. It will be in tune with the democratic polity we have adopted. When political executive is given full decision-making powers, they should be made equally accountable to the people for their decisions.
  • In order to bring about informed decision-making, ULGs should install sound management information systems and should make use of all means of modern information technology.
  • In order to speed up the decision-making process especially in the general council and various committees made up of elected representatives, the concept of ‘Guillotining’ should be introduced.
  • In order to make decision making transparent in ULGs, state governments should frame suitable transparency legislation binding to ULGs. For example State of Karnataka has made a beginning in this direction.
  • In order to make decision-making participative, the mechanism of ward and circle committees envisaged in 74 CAA should be put in practice in right earnest. Similar kind of other mechanism promoting peoples’ participation should be adopted by ULGs.

Finance Function

There is urgent need to install a finance function in ULGs in place of the present inadequate bookkeeping, procedural auditing, ritualistic budgeting and zero financial reporting. The investment, financing and dividend decision-making areas of finance function must be carried out in a scientific way. For this ULGs will have to undertake following reforms –

  • Adoption of modified accrual base fund accounting system. Ideally right from the beginning it should be implemented on on-line computerization basis. This reform is quite possible. More than 100 ULGs have implemented this reform. For example accounting reforms have been implemented by all ULGs of Tamil Nadu State and by individual ULGs like Vadodara, Indore, Surat, Ahmedabad, Banglore and Ludhiana etc.
  • Introduction of performance or efficiency auditing in place of conventional procedural auditing.
  • Financial reporting with adherence to accounting standards and disclosure norms in a reasonable time frame. Special efforts to disseminate financial results to the people.
  • Adoption of Participative and performance budgeting practices. For example efforts of Vadodara Municipal Corporation of Gujarat.

Controlling Function

  • Setting up of controlling network for each critical activity point, section or department or individual.
  • The plans should be prepared and expressed in such a way that they facilitate their conversion into standards for controlling.
  • Identification of suitable performance indicators for measuring performance.
  • Creation of suitable database and information system to facilitate measuring and evaluation of performance objectively.
  • The possible deviations, which may take place with the plans, should be thought out in advance and appropriate contingency plans should be kept prepared to facilitate correcting deviation efforts of controlling function.
  • Feedback essentially involve time lag, computer technology should to used to speed up feedback process so that corrective actions regarding deviations can be taken as early as possible.

Summing Up

The term ‘Good Governance’ has continuously evolved with the development of human civilization. It has acquired much broader meaning recently in the wake of globalization, economic liberalization and corporatisation.

Good Governance is a broader notion than good government. It involves governments and also civil society (citizens, civic institutions, etc). Good governance in the urban management context includes all of the laws, regulations, frameworks, management systems and processes, social and cultural surroundings in which an urban local government operates. Thus good urban governance has now more of management and social overtones than political or philosophical.

In recent years it’s the social perspective, which involves civil society in governance that has received some attention. But the management perspective has remained unattended in Indian ULGs. The management perspective (which obviously includes finance function) of good governance is much more relevant in case of an ULG than any other level of government as ULGs possess a dual character. An ULG is not only miniature body politic but it is also a body corporate.

The management function described above constitutes ‘maintenance factor’ whose presence does not bring great fortune or employee motivation but their absence brings disaster or demotivation to an organization. The absence of hard-core municipal management system reforms efforts is the root cause of weak urban governance situation in India.

Each and every aspect of management function in ULGs is riddled with the deficiencies, neglect and non-augmentation. Without strengthening it or making it efficient and effective it will not be possible to have good urban governance.

There can be several reforms to strengthen management function in the role of an ULG; it is difficult to list all of them. Some of them have been enumerated in this paper. It is also difficult to prioritise them as all them have become overdue and essential. An ULG striving to deliver good urban governance should select some of these reforms based on its own perception of situation, requirements, resources available and commitment.

Source : Dr. Ravikant Joshi, National Workshop on Municipal Reforms for Good Governance

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(Septembert-2017)- Administrative Restructuring


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Administrative Reforms


ADMINISTRATIVE RESTRUCTURING

When India achieved independence, it inherited a colonial legacy in administration, which was suited to the needs of revenue collection and maintenance of law and order. During the. years following independence, the Indian government was mostly pre-occupied with the problems of administrative integration of the princely states and the rehabilitation of the refugees and the displaced.

With India becoming republic the objectives for the development of the country was spelt out. The focus shifted to the social and economic development of the country. Attention was directed to people-oriented administration. Administration had to be responsive to the development needs of the people. Thus, there was a need to reform the administration to suit the needs of independent India.

The Government of India undertook various measures for bringing in reforms in administration. It constituted various committees and commissions and organised conferences to suggest reforms in administration. We will be discussing them in the ensuing sections.

We will first discuss the meaning, needs, and types of administrative reforms, which will be followed by the reform steps and measures undertaken in the country since independence.

MEANING OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

'Administrative reforms can, in short, be defined as artificial inducement of administrative transformation against resistance. This definition highlights three distinct elements, namely:

  • Administrative reform is artificially stimulated;
  • It is a transformatory process; and
  • There is existence of resistance to change process.

Obviously, reforms do not take place by themselves. They are pre-meditated, well studied and planned programmes with definite objectives in view. Reform is an induced and manipulated change, for it involves persuasion, collaboration and generation of conviction for betterment.

Reform is more than a series of incremental changes or marginal adjustments, though it may result from the cumulation of small changes, which periodically creates requirement for comprehensive and systematic efforts.

Administrative reform paves the way for new order. It refers to the formal, mechanistic and meditated process of structured change.

NEED FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

The distinguishing characteristic of modernised social system is its ability to deal with continuous systematic transformation. Society has to change in order to free itself from the shackles of traditionalism, cope with the changes in environment, adopt fresh innovative culture, adopt new knowledge and technology and crave for a new order through elimination of the old structures and system.

Administrative reform is but a part of the universality of this change, for administration is nothing but a sub-culture, a social sub-system reflecting the values of the wider society. Administration must also correspondingly change to be in step with the outer modernisation process. Or else, disequilibrium would set in, resulting. in imbalances, dysfunctionalities, maladjustments and goal displacement.

According to Fred W. Riggs administrative reform is a "problem of dynamic balancing ". Since public administration functions within a political context, its basic character, content and style of functioning is greatly influenced by the political environment, its institutional dynamics and process, in not merely setting national goals, priorities, or deciding between competing values, and allocating resources but also in devising the most effective instrument for translating these policies into successful programme realities. Added to this, the advances in Information and Communication Technology (ICT), and the state's pervasive role in managing national assets and resources, controlling the entire economy through regulation and development, ensuring a just and equitable economic order, correcting age old social imbalances through newer forms of institution-making, and ushering in an egalitarian social system, has thrown up new tasks for administration. This requires fundamental and foundational improvement in the administrative capabilities. The latter, in turn, requires proper planning, educational re-arrangement, skill-generation, attitude-formation and a host of other structural-functional reorganisation.

With the nineties came the market reforms, and there was an emphasis on structural adjustment. Good governance is the stress of the governments of the day, with focus on accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency and decentralisation. With focus on good governance today, there has been a greater change in the conventional role of the State, the government and the bureaucracy. Today, there is shift from responsiveness to partnership and collaboration. The importance is given to people's participation in governance and the involvement of the multiple actors. With citizen's participation and collaboration taking centre stage, the government have to act as partners with the citizens. Administration cannot fulfil the newer roles with the traditional organisation and methods. - It has to be people friendly and work on public trust. Hence, the bureaucracy has to change to adapt to the new role. This need for change in turn necessitate reforms.

TYPES OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS

Administrative reforms, according to Gerald E. Caiden, can be of four types.

  • Reforms imposed through politica changes.
  • Reforms introduced to remedy organisational rigidity.
  • Reforms through the legal system, and
  • Reforms through changes in attitude.

Reforms imposed through political changes

Administration is shaped and influenced by political forces. The change in political scene also affects administration. Structure and working of administration is affected by political changes.

Reforms introduced to remedy organisational rigidity

Bureaucratic structures have to change to be flexible. The rigidity in the structure of administration has to be removed. The changes can take place in the form of restructuring, reinvention, realignment, rethinking and reengineering.

Reforms through the legal system

Laws pertaining to administrative reform can lead to significant changes in administration. Legislation is normally preceded by consultations and deliberations in several forums such as committees, commissions, press etc.

Reforms through changes in attitude

Human beings are an important part of any organisation. Change in their attitude will help in bringing reforms. No legal, structural and political change can lead to desired reform unless and until these are appreciated and accepted by the people working in the organisation.

EVALUATION

At the Central level, various ministries and departments have been slow in implementing the reforms. The citizen's charters lack quality, as many of the ministries and departments have renamed their information brochures as charters. The citizens as well as the employees also seem to be unaware of the charters. The computerization and networking is yet to be fully implemented by the Centre and the States;

The review of laws has not been taken up at the required pace. The Lokpal Bill is lingering in the Parliament. The Department of AR&PG found that many of the Information and Facilitation Counters set up by the ministries and departments are non-functional. The code of ethics is yet to come up. The voluntary retirement scheme has also not been properly taken up. At the State level, much is left to be achieved. The Right to Information Act has been place in several States, but it has not been properly implemented.

Nothing has been going beyond the 73rd and 74•h constitutional amendments. The States have not implemented the constitutional amendments in letter and spirit. As a result, decentralisation has suffered a setback. The States have not adequately streamlined the function of the panchayats. In some States more powers has bee.n vested with the district and intermediate levels whereas in some States more powers have been given to the gram panchayats and the intermediate levels and not to the district level. The States have not provided these bodies with adequate staffand finances in relation to the subjects allocated to them. Again, the district planning committees have not been set up by a number of states. The gra~ sabha are not fully empowered as their powers and procedures have not been properly laid down. The urban local bodies have lost their importance due to the multiplicity of corresponding institutions that have come up to carry out varied functions pertaining to housing, urban regulation, water and sewerage, and power distribution. Also, there is dearth of resources, which creates problems for rendering better services.

MINISTRY OF PERSONNEL, PUBLIC GRIEVANCES AND PENSIONS

A Department of Administrative Reforms was set up within the Ministry of Home Affairs in March 1964 to suggest reforms and conduct studies on all aspects of administration relating to the organisation, methods and personnel.

The 0 & M Division, which was earlier functioning under the cabinet secretariat, was transferred to it.

Based on the recommendations of the ARC, a Department of Personnel was set up in the cabinet secretariat on l st August 1970. All matters pertaining to the civil services were transferred to this Department from the Ministry of Home Affairs. Further, on 7th February I 973, the work relating to the Department of Administrative Reforms was also transferred to it and the Department was redesignated as Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms. Jn Anril 1977, the Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms was shifted from the cabinet secretariat to the Ministry of Home Affairs and this arrangement continued till the end of 1984. Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms. was also set up at the State level.

The Department of Personnel and Administrative Reforms was elevated to a full fledged Ministry• of Personnel and Training, Administrative Reforms, Public Grievances and Pensions in March 1985. On December 10, 1985 this Ministry underwent further change in its nomenclature and was re-designated as the Ministry of Personnel, Public Grievances and Pensions with three departments namely, Department of Personnel and Training (DOPT), Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances and Department of Pension and Pensioners' Welfare.. A major highlight of this arrangement was that, firstly the Ministry was placed under the overall charge of the Prime Minister assisted by a Minister of State. Secondly, the subject of public grievances was added to Department of Administrative Reforms. This allocation was effected under the rationale that it would provide a closer and integrated view of the inadequacies of the administrative system that gives rise to grievances, on the one hand, and how the administrative machinery could be made adaptive to the changing requirements, on the other. Thirdly, a separate Department was created to handle the subject of Pension and Pensioner's Welfare.

We will be basically concentrating on the functions of the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances.

Functions of the Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances

With the creation -of the Department under the Ministry in 1985, the following tasks were assigned to it:

  • Matters pertaining to the conduct, coordination and evaluation of administrative reforms.
  • Matters pertaining to organisation an methods.
  • All policy matters and issues relating to the redressal of public grievances in general and grievances pertaining to the Central government agencies in particular.

Administrative reforms are vital for the sustenance of the government machinery. The focus on good governance today has necessitated reforms in government as well as in administration. The Government of India undertook reform measures since independence. Various commissions and committees were set up to suggest reforms in the administrative system, organisation, methods and procedures. One of the important commissions to suggest reform was the ARC, which made recommendations covering the entire gamut of administration at the Centre and States.

Major reforms in the recent years pertain to the implementation of the Action Plan on Effective and Responsive Government. There are three vital components of the Plan that aims at making administration responsive and citizen friendly, transparent with the right to information, and improvement of the performance and integrity of the civil services. The Centre and States have implemented the Plan to a certain extent. More steps in this regard are on the anvil.

The Department of Administrative Reforms and Public Grievances is the nodal agency of the GO! for administrative reforms as well as for redressal of public grievances.

SOURCE ; INDIRA GANDHI NATIONAL OPEN UNIVERSITY LEARNING MATERIAL

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(Septembert-2017)-Citizens-As-Customers-–-Charters-And-The-Contractualisation-Of-Quality-In-Public-Services


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Accountability and Control


Citizens As Customers – Charters And The Contractualisation Of Quality In Public Services
 

                                        - The UK Citizen’s Charter

The original version of the UK Citizen's Charter was officially launched in a White Paper, published in July 1991 (Cabinet Office, 1991). Although it pursued themes (value for money, increased competition, privatisation, greater emphasis upon performance measurement, etc.) that were already well in train by the time Mr Major took over the premiership from Mrs Thatcher in 1990, the Charter was presented from the outset as encapsulating the prime minister's personal vision of the public services. The initiative had support from, among others, the free market think tank, the Adam Smith Institute (Pirie, 1992), and it remained a core part of the Conservative Government’s programme until the change of government in 1997. It was then repackaged and relaunched by Tony Blair’s Labour administration, and has become absorbed into the continuing process of ’modernising’ public services.

The original Citizen’s Charter reaffirmed the Government's continuing commitment to privatisation, to the further contracting out of public services, and to the extension of compulsory competitive tenderingiii; but it implicitly accepted that a lot of services should remain within the public sector - while arguing that they must be more consumer-sensitive. Its main themes (to paraphrase some of the relevant sections of the1991 White Paper) were:

  • Higher standards: publication, in clear language, of standards of service; tougher, independent inspectorates; a ‘Charter Mark’ scheme to commend bodies that abide by the terms of the Charter.
  • Openness: elimination of secrecy about organisational arrangements, costs of service, etc. Staff to be identified by name badges.
  • Information: regular publication of information about performance targets, and how well they have been met.
  • Choice: ‘the public sector should provide choice wherever practicable’.
  • Non-Discrimination: services to be available regardless of race or sex; leaflets to be printed in minority languages where there is a need.
  • Accessibility: ‘services should be run to suit the convenience of customers, not staff.’
  • Proper redress when things go wrong: ‘at the very least the citizen is entitled to a good explanation, or an apology’; better machinery for redress of grievances (including, as originally envisaged, a system of local lay adjudicators to deal with minor claims for redress); adequate remedies, including compensation where appropriate.

The Charter was to apply to central government departments and their Next Steps executive agencies; also to local government, the National Health Service, the police – and even the courts, where there are special sensitivities about judicial independence. It also promised stronger powers for the regulatory agencies that oversee the privatized public utilities like British Telecom, and the gas, electricity and water industries (all of which have their own charters).

The Raison d’Être of the Charter Initiative - The ‘New Right’ Perspective

In a pamphlet published by the Conservative Political Centre, John Major’s Public Service Minister, William Waldegrave. wrote as follows about the post-war reforms of public services:

By a process that was, in retrospect, inevitable, it turned out that we had designed public services where the interests of the providers systematically outweighed those of the users, and which, driven only by the natural tendency of all provider organisations to claim that they can only do better with more money, contained an overwhelming dynamic for increased cost which was bound to end in conflict with reality. Many loyal public servants did good work within them - but the seeds of their own destruction were firmly embedded in the organisations' structures (Waldegrave, 1993, p. 8).

He conceded that the language used in support of policies of privatisation in the 1980s was not focussed ‘where in reality the focus of our concern is - on the user of the service until the language of the Citizen's Charter began to turn the national debate in the right direction before and after the election of 1992.’ Moving away from expenditure as the only ‘index of compassion’ and reasserting the primacy of outputs is, he argued, a way of avoiding the presentation to the electorate of ‘a false choice between low rates of taxation and high standards of service’ (Waldegrave, 1993, p. 10).

He went on to claim that, internationally, Britain had been ‘blazing a trail on public service reform in the 1990s’ and that innovations like the Citizen’s Charter had influenced and anticipated changes and reform agendas in other countries - for instance, Osborne and Gaebler’s, Reinventing Government (1992; see also Gore, 1993).

But other commentators have stressed that the pre-history of the Charter, and the credit for its invention lies elsewhere, particularly in local government. The public lawyer, Ian Harden, has noted the precedent of the ‘customer contracts, pioneered by some English local authorities in the 1980s’ (Harden, 1992, p. x). Rod Rhodes - citing his own experiences, working with York city council - states categorically that ‘citizen’s charters originated in local government, not with John Major’ (Rhodes, 1997, p.129). And David Prior has concluded that charters ‘arrived on the managerialist tide that flooded local government in the 1980s’ (Prior, 1995, p. 100). In his foreword to the Charter White Paper (Cabinet Office, 1991), John Major himself wrote that, ‘to make public services answer better to the wishes of their users, and to raise their quality overall, have been ambitions of mine since I was a local councillor in Lambeth over twenty years ago.’

While a ‘consumerist’ tendency in local government and elsewhere is an important element of the pre-history of the Citizen’s Charter, it is clear that, in the early 1990s, the ministerial and civil service architects of the Charter were anxious to claim it as a logical extension of the Thatcherite New Right’s public sector reform programme and, in particular, as being a natural evolutionary progression from the ‘Next Steps’ agency programme, launched in 1988 (Greer, 1994). The Charter became, from the outset, a prominent feature of the agendas of executive agencies and of the framework agreements that define their performance targets. Brian Hilton, the first director of the Citizen's Charter Unit in the Cabinet Office, saw the Charter as:

  • the next stage after Next Steps. Next Steps gets management sorted out and now we are saying with greater clarity what we want management to deliver. This is not a nine-day wonder. It is very much a long-term problem (quoted by Hennessy, 1991).
  • John Major’s tenure as prime minister, which ended with his party’s emphatic defeat in the general election of May 1997, saw his Citizen’s Charter reach its sixth birthday. The main features of the Charter regime inherited by Tony Blair from his predecessor included:
  • 41 national Charters covering the major public services: e.g. the Patient’s Charter, the Parent’s Charter, the Courts Charter, the Taxpayer’s Charter.
  • over 10,000 local charters, prepared by local agencies (e.g. doctors’ surgeries, hospital trusts, schools, local authority services and local job centres) in consultation with service users.
  • the annual Charter Mark award scheme, recognising excellence and innovation in public service (at the time of the consultation exercise, below, there were 645 holders of the award. Over 3,600 services had applied for the award, and more than 1,100 were successfulv ).
  • 24 Charter quality networks around the UK. These were established by the Charter Unit in 1994, and consisted of small groups of managers from public services and privatized utilities who met locally to exchange ideas on issues relating to customer service and quality.
  • A Good Practice Guide, produced by a Citizen’s Charter complaints task force, and published in June 1995, containing recommendations on how public services can improve their handling of complaints.
  • The regular publication of performance league tables, notably in the fields of education and health services.

The initiative was signalled as John Major’s ‘big idea’, something that would give a distinctive flavour to the Major era of public service reform, after ten years of Thatcherism. As noted in Waldegrave's apologia, cited above, although the Charter carried forward familiar 1980s New Public Management themes, it also hinted at a confession of past doctrinal (or at least presentational) error – perhaps even a tacit admission that ‘the “minimising” elements of the government’s reform strategy may have gone too far’ (Lffler, 2003, p. 481). But unkind critics might interpret this, not so much as a disclaimer, but as an attempt to claim distinctiveness for what was, in essence, a populist re-packaging of Thatcherite reforms, perhaps designed implicitly to rebut Mrs Thatcher's famously dismissive observation that ‘there is no such thing as Majorism.’ As one commentator put it, ‘the Citizen's Charter is partly a genuine article of belief for John Major and partly a vehicle for symbolically differentiating him from his predecessor’ (Doern, 1993, p. 20).

New Labour, New Charter

In Opposition, ‘New Labour’ politicians had been scornful of some of the more ambitious claims made on behalf of the Charter by Conservative ministers, but its main specific objections were to do with the Charter’s lack of enforceable rights and legislative ‘teeth’ (e.g. with regard to freedom of information). Under the leadership of Tony Blair in the 1990s, the Party had begun to adopt some of the ideas and rhetoric of the ‘communitarian’ movement – represented, for instance by Amitai Etzioni, who had written that:

Communitarians favour strong democracy. That is, we seek to make government more representative, more participatory, and more responsive to all members of the community. We seek to find ways to accord citizens more information and more say, more often (Etzioni, 1995, p. 235).

Lessons were also learned from the Clinton-Gore National Performance Review. And references to the desirability of creating a more socially inclusive ‘stakeholder’ society began to appear in the speeches of Blair and his party associates. There were regular references to the need to restore power and functions to local government and to improving mechanisms of public accountability. The Charter - suitably modified, and relaunched with appropriate New Labour packaging - was seen as having a contribution to make to the new government’s goals.

Charterism – too much stick and not enough carrot?

From the outset the authors of the UK Citizen’s Charter made it clear that one important principle underlying the initiative was to improve value for money for the citizen- taxpayer, by making public resources go further. This has been an important driving force behind public sector reform in Britain, and in many other countries. Charters impose a discipline on service providers at relatively little central cost.

It is plausible to suggest that the new disciplines of a charter may usefully focus the minds of service providers, operating at the interface between a State and its ‘empowered’ citizen-customers, on finding ways of improving standards when resources are having to be squeezed. But, given the hierarchical nature of many public service institutions the definition of the ‘provider’ can be problematical. Much of the immediate impact of charters falls upon relatively low paid and/or junior state employees (e.g. railway station staff, school teachers, hospital receptionists, front line officers in tax and benefits offices) who have to bear - without extra rewards, and sometimes with little or no extra training - the brunt of complaints and criticisms by ‘empowered’ customers. A newspaper article published a few months after the launch of the Charter quoted an assistant manager in the Benefits Agency as saying that ‘most of us see it as quite a cynical exercise to paper over the cracks in the service’; the general secretary of the Civil and Public Services Association was quoted as saying that the Charter is ‘all stick and no carrot’ (Willmore, 1992).

Charters - ‘Rights’ without Laws?

Alongside controversies about the ambiguities of ‘citizenship’ are other issues associated with making reference to a ‘charter’, a word that has formal and legalistic connotations. But despite the resonance of the language with grand constitutional statements of the past, such as Magna Carta, the UK Citizen’s Charter was not a constitutional document. And it has been a feature of the UK Charter that it does not directly imply the conferment of legal entitlements.

The Citizen's Charter offered no Bill of Rights (though it talked a lot about rights), nor a Freedom of Information Act. It comprised a melange of aims and exhortations, rendered more amorphous by the diversity of the services and institutions to which it applied. In the words of the 1991 White Paper:

The Charter programme will be pursued in a number of ways. The approach will vary from service to service in different parts of the United Kingdom. The Citizen's Charter is not a blueprint which imposes a drab and uniform pattern on every service. It is a toolkit of initiatives and ideas to raise standards in the way most appropriate to each service (Cabinet Office, 1991, p. 4).

The Charter itself was never intended to be a justiciable document, conferring legal rights that could be enforced in the courts. William Waldegrave, true to the British tradition of regarding law and lawyers as impediments rather than as aids to good government, told the House of Commons Treasury and Civil Service Committee, with reference to the improved redress of grievance systems promised by the Charter, that 'if we can avoid getting too many lawyers involved in these redress systems, except when issues are very, very serious, so much the better I think...' .

This approach is symptomatic of the historic resistance of the British political and bureaucratic culture to the development of administrative law and administrative codes. As the political scientist Fred Ridley - a European comparativist, well placed to observe the peculiarities of the British resistance to public law - once observed, ‘the idea of 'political' rather than 'legal' protection of citizens against administration is deeply embedded in British political traditions and has imprinted itself on British ways of thought’ (Ridley, 1984, p. 4).

There have been some important recent developments in UK public law. We now even have an Administrative Court, and the Blair Government’s decision to incorporate the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law by enactment of the Human Rights Act 1998 has already had an impact on law and administration. The development in New Public Management contexts of more contractual, quasi-contractual and pseudo- contractual modes of service delivery also has important implications, some with legal significance.

But the fact remains that, compared with many other countries - particularly some of the UK’s continental European neighbours, such as France - public law has a relatively low profile, as does the concept of legally enforceable rights. As one British commentator has put it.

Charterism - Something for Everyone?

There is plenty of scope for philosophical debate and ideological dispute about the meaning and the merits of charterism. But, for practical purposes, it is probably appropriate to regard these charters, not as a universal and rigidly pre-ordained schedule of principles and objectives but as a series of packages, of broadly similar shape, but with different wrapping paper to suit the location and the occasion. As has been noted, variants of the charter package can comfortably be embraced both by New Right free market individualists and by New Left collectivists with communitarian leanings. The wrapping paper - the rhetoric used to discuss charters, and the relative emphasis placed on one aspect rather than another - may vary, but the actual contents, can often, in the end, look very similar.

Charters are to be found in states with strong traditions of administrative and constitutional law, as well as in the UK, where these characteristics are much less evident. However, one would expect more legalistic systems of public administration to have different perceptions of what charters mean and how they are to be enforced. The ‘empowerment’ ingredient of charters may be played down in countries with weak traditions of electoral democracy; or played up in countries whose governments want to encourage more civic awareness and participation. Charters exist in unitary states with highly centralized systems of governance (paradoxically, they can be used both to reinforce central control of decentralized institutions, and as a counterweight to excessive centralization); they are also found in countries with federal arrangements and/or strong traditions of localized public administration.

To pursue the ‘package’ metaphor a little further, there is a danger that attractive wrapping paper may raise unrealistically high expectations that are doomed to disappointment when the package is opened. This is particularly the case if (as some critics of the original UK Charter complained) some of the contents turn out to be recycled items from the past. A charter package can be made to look very appealing. The ostensible message of charters - simultaneously bureau-sceptical and appealing to democratic and populist sentiments - is hard for anyone to quarrel with. The promise of better and more user-friendly services with no extra burdens falling on the taxpayer may seem almost too good to be true.

There has been a lot of discussion - the UK and elsewhere - whether charters really ‘work’. Some of this debate is of a technical kind: to do, for instance, with the authenticity of performance measurement - what do ‘league tables’ of schools (based mainly on examination performance) and hospitals (based, for instance, on waiting times for surgery) or police forces (based on such indicators as crime clear-up rates and the time taken to respond to emergency calls) really tell us? And, even if the technical controversies about performance rankings could be resolved, what, in the real world, can the empowered citizen, whose choices of alternative service providers are often limited, do with this information?

The impact of the Charter Mark scheme is currently being investigated in various public service organisations, beginning with the Court Service of England and Wales, the first organisation to undertake a corporate programme of Charter Mark applications and to adopt Charter Mark as its national service standard. The consultancy company, ORC International, analysed data from 17,877 civil and family court customers across 218 courts, collected between February 2001 and February 2004. It found that that service at public counters received significantly higher satisfaction ratings (88%) than those without the award (80%); satisfaction with telephone service was 83% for Charter Mark courts, compared with 74% for non-Charter Mark courts; for written correspondence the respective figures were 80% and 74%; and for complaints handling they were 36% and 26% (Thompson, 2005).

These findings obviously relate to only one aspect of charterism, in one service sector, and need to be interpreted with caution. Establishing cause and effect relationships in quality-improvement schemes is notoriously difficult.

The British experience does suggest that the Citizen’s Charter has probably had beneficial effects on quality of service. However, there have been intermittent allegations (many of them anecdotal) that performance outcomes may sometimes be manipulated by those involved - e.g. police officers who are reluctant to log reports of crimes that they know they cannot solve; students being entered for examinations only if their school is sure that they will pass; railway timetables adjusted so that trains are seldom ‘late’; postboxes re-labelled with the last collection time rather than with a series of detailed collection times from morning until evening.

When addressing the question ‘do charters work’?, two related considerations must be borne in mind. First, that what ‘works’ in one national or sectoral context may not work in another. Secondly, and perhaps more crucially, it must be remembered that charters - although they contain a lot of uncontentiously sensible messages about improving service quality and efficiency, and about increasing citizen satisfaction - are not value- neutral documents. Their purpose and content is strongly driven by political considerations. There is a political message to be read between every line of every school performance league table.

Charters – How ‘Contractual’?

A movement towards contractual arrangements, of varying degrees of ‘hardness’ and ‘softness’, has been a pervasive feature of public management reform in many countries around the world in the past two or three decades. However, in their introduction to a volume of essays, published five years ago under the auspices of this study group, the editors, Yvonne Fortin and Hugo Van Hassel, observed that regular usage of the term ‘contract’ in public management contexts is comparatively recent. They noted that ‘the terms agreement, convention, commitment and pact had often been favoured, especially when indicating those agreements with no legal value’ [i.e. what we might nowadays refer to as soft contracts, see below] (Fortin and Van Hassel, 2000, p. 4). And they went on to suggest various explanations for the growing dominance of the term in public management discourse, the first being the nature of some of a contract’s technical attributes:

The contract represents a tried and tested legal technique that serves to implement a mechanism along with a set of arguments easily acceptable to lay audiences; included herein would be: the necessity for the two parties to be distinct entities, the principle of equality between both parties, the principle of negotiation, the notion of reciprocity and the fulfillment of commitments (ibid. p. 6).

They also observe that the perceived neutrality of the term contract makes it an attractive device for politicians seeking to build a consensus for public sector reform; it has international currency; and It also conveys an aura of the private sector, and in particular a commercial tone, which within today’s context of economic competitiveness and attraction for the private sector’s latest generation of management tools gets interpreted as a stamp of seriousness and efficiency (ibid).

The UK provides many illustrative examples, including agency framework agreements and internal markets (soft) to private finance initiatives (hard). However, in practice, the hard/soft dichotomy is seldom clear-cut: for example, the hard contractual bottom line of a private finance initiative may need softening along the way, though negotiation and mutual trust, in order to make it work.

Harlow and Rawlings (1997, p. 211, see also chapter 5) use the term, ‘pseudo-contracts’, noting ‘the link with the idea of citizen as consumer expressed in the Citizen’s Charter: the portrayal of the relationship in contractual terms – services in return for taxes… ‘ At one level, the use of such pseudo-contractual language can be seen as an attractive addition to the armoury of political rhetoric (cf. Fortin and Van Hassel, above). So the contractual resonance of a citizen’s charter is at least as much presentational as substantive.

When we look more closely at how far, if at all, citizen’s charters fit into the contractual picture, with particular reference to the hard/soft dichtomy, an interestingly ambiguous picture emerges. A convenient overview of the main characteristics of hard and soft models of contracting is to be found in Anne Davies’ account of contracting in the UK National Health Service, (Davies, 2001, p. 92):

‘Hard model:

• Low trust relationship between the parties
• Standard-setting through adversarial negotiations
• Comprehensive and precisely drafted standards
• Monitoring through ‘policing’
• Enforcement through sanctions, particularly exit

Soft model :

• High trust relationship between the parties
• Standard-setting through collaborative negotiations
• Broadly drafted, general standards and written assumptions
• Monitoring through shared information or trusting the provider to comply
• Enforcement through ‘persuasion’

How do these characteristics (and those noted by Fortin and Van Hassel) apply to UK- type citizen’s charters? In the remarks that follow, I take ‘the parties’ to be the service provider on the one hand and the citizen customer on the other. However, a more elaborate analysis would require us to factor in the relationship (sometimes a pseudo- contractual one) between the provider and the State/government, particularly in so far as the government may have been the active initiator of a charter programme, which then trickles outwards and downwards into each service sector:

(1) Nature of relationship between the parties: one important object of a charter is to encourage improved trust between citizen and provider, through improved transparency and accountability; in a democracy, regime legitimacy (sometimes a fragile commodity) might be taken as an analogue of trust. However, the ‘empowerment’ subtext of charterism might be regarded as actively fostering ‘distrust’ – encouraging citizens to look more carefully at quality of service and not to take what they are told at face value. The ‘equality’ and ‘reciprocity’, highlighted by Fortin and van Hassel are often conspicuous by their absence, though we have noted (with reference to the UK National Health Service) recognition that consumer entitlements may need to be balanced against reciprocal social and civic obligations.

(2) Standard-setting: in general, the content of charters is unilaterally determined by the providers. There is no negotiation, though providers sometimes take steps to ascertain consumers’ attitudes and preferences.

(3) Formality and precision of the drafting: charters are drafted in general and informal terms (usually by non-lawyers).

(4) Monitoring: varies in scope. Charters themselves are seldom explicitly ‘policed’. But sometimes service-quality outcomes are linked to other mechanisms, such as the framework agreements of next steps executive agencies, and breaches may have implications e.g. for the tenure of chief executives and their performance-related pay. Performance league-tables (e.g. school exam results, hospital waiting lists) are regularly invoked by ministers, who hold the purse-strings of public funding, and may link to more formal quality measurement regimes, such as ‘best value’. Regulatory bodies have regard to service quality criteria (some of which may appear in charters) e.g. when allowing the Post Office to increase postal charges or franchised railway companies to increase their fares.

(5)Enforcement: charters involve no legal enforcement. ‘Exit’, identified by Davies as a common sanction associated with hard contracts, is also potentially a bottom line of informed consumer choice (though is easier said than done in what are often monopolistic or near-monopolistic contexts). Another area of enforcement has to do with what happens inside the provider-organisation itself - the role of a charter as a management tool (cf. earlier reference to ‘sticks and carrots’).

My general conclusion from all this is that citizen’s charters do indeed have a place in the realm of government by contract – albeit as pseudo-contracts, which go nowhere near to satisfying the criteria of mutuality, parity, reciprocity and legal enforceability that are minimal requirements for true contractual relationships. To some extent, the adjective ‘soft’ overlaps with the prefix ‘pseudo’ but the citizen’s charter case suggests that they are not quite identical. Informal drafting and non-enforceability in court are common factors, but the possibility of financial sanctions in some contexts and (if Davies is right) the potential for consumer exit gives this curious species of soft-pseudo contract a slightly hard edge.

Source - Gavin Drewry

Professor of Public Administration,

Royal Holloway, University of London

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(August-2017)-Stand against reform


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Current Development


Stand against reform

                                        - Indian Express Editorial

To shore up a bad argument, it is always a good idea to threaten vague but dire consequences for traditional institutions. The central government has reached for this lifeline in its affidavit filed in Delhi High Court, opposing the criminalisation of marital rape for fear of damaging the very institution of marriage. Its stand goes against the grain of recent progressive rulings like the affirmation of the Right to Privacy and the abolition of triple talaq, and recommendations of the Justice JS Verma committee in 2013. If the government has its way, a woman subjected to sexual violence within the fold of marriage can only seek civil relief through the 2005 Act protecting against domestic violence.

From the time of John Stuart Mill, Western democracies have grappled with the question of women’s sexual autonomy, without which equality is an empty shell. Many have taken the ethical choice. On women’s issues, as in the case of recognition granted by the Supreme Court in 2015 to live-in relationships for purposes of inheritance, conferring rights which even reformist Sweden does not offer, Indian courts and legislatures have often taken progressive positions. Now, however, the government is doing a disservice by impeding the momentum of reform in India. It vainly argued against privacy rights, it wants to keep marital rape off the statute books. It must recall Justice J.S. Verma’s recommendation of a separate bill of rights for women guaranteeing “complete sexual autonomy”.

Autonomy is the big legal question facing India, as the nation decides between a progressive culture of individual dignity and freedom, and a society regimented by traditional norms favouring powers conferred by birth and circumstance. The Delhi High Court is refereeing one skirmish in a larger battle. The contested point is dignity for women who are, by and large, the designated victims of sexual politics. Criminalising marital rape will not damage the institution of marriage, as the government fears. It will humanise it by purging it of its baser elements. The J.S. Verma committee had recommended the mandatory registration of all marriages before a magistrate, irrespective of the personal laws under which they were solemnised. Against the progressive tide of the times, the stand of the government on privacy and marital rape is simply unsustainable. To spare itself further embarrassment, it should seek better counsel.

(Source- The Indian Express)

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(August-2017)-Privacy, dignity and Sexual Autonomy


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Right to Privacy


Privacy, dignity and Sexual Autonomy

                                        - By Apar Gupta

One of the lowest points in the history of the Indian Supreme Court has been when during the proclamation of Emergency, it refused to enforce fundamental rights. By its decision in ADM Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla the court agreed with the government to suspend fundamental rights thereby permitting it to hold people in detention, without any opportunity to move court. More importantly, it gave wide police powers to the government to pursue state interests at the cost of fundamental rights. This very tension between the government and the individual came into play in the right to privacy hearings which have delivered a historic judgement.

The right to privacy was a constitutionally accepted and applied right recognised by an interpretative device of the Supreme Court since 1975. Over the decades, more than 30 decisions of the apex court applied privacy as a bundle of rights that permitted liberty of thought and action. Some instances include safeguards against indiscriminate phone tapping, narco analysis and even bodily integrity. However, about two years ago, this was thrown into doubt when in the midst of the hearings of the Aadhaar case the government disputed the very basis of the right to privacy. To be fair, this was a technical argument that required an answer due to judicial propriety, though it lacked substantive merit. Yesterday, nine judges of the Supreme Court said in one voice and six judgements, that the right to privacy is inherent in our fundamental rights.

Lawyers will, over the next few weeks, spend substantial time debating its reasoning but there are a few noticeable features which are clearly evident. The constitutional right to privacy is no longer in any dispute and stands on firm ground. Its breadth is established over the entire chapter of fundamental rights, which include equality, free expression, right to life, religion. This also means the Aadhaar cases will now proceed for arguments on their merits which were gridlocked due to this pending decision. But this case goes far beyond Aadhaar and holds the promise of renewing the vitality of the complete spectrum of civil liberties. For instance, the judgement quite clearly establishes the link between privacy, dignity and sexual autonomy. In doing this, it undercuts the basis of another dark stain on the history of the court when three years ago in the Suresh Koushal v. Naz Foundation case, the court refused to strike down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. It is now only matter of time when the case will be formally overruled.

The basis of this is a key recognition of the nature of privacy being a natural right. The Supreme Court, by stating that the state does not bestow privacy, also has limited its ability to take it away. While recognising that even natural rights are subject to limitations, high thresholds are prescribed. This follows the reasoning of Justice H.R. Khanna in the ADM. Jabalpur case who wrote the sole dissent at a time when confronting the government with constitutionalism seemed impractical. Justice Khanna put his ascendance to the chair of the Chief Justice of India in peril by stating that the government of the day could not destroy fundamental rights. But losing against the majority he fashioned his dissent as an, “appeal to the brooding spirit of the law, to the intelligence of a future day”. This was an act of constitutional principle and judicial courage. Recognising his call, our Supreme Court has finally overruled ADM Jabalpur, but will our court assimilated the principles of constitutionalism?

Right To Privacy Is A Fundamental Right, Says SC

While the privacy judgement is a cause for celebration, its full benefit will only come when it is applied to actual state actions that undermine privacy. Adherence to constitutional principle is not an academic exercise, but requires a prompt protection of real rights and liberties. Judicial action should spring at moments when the state oversteps onto the citizen. Few would dispute that determinations on privacy would be of greater benefit when the Supreme Court protects us with foresight rather than retrospect.

It is necessary to recognise that the government has not only wagered the right to privacy in the Supreme Court but has taken various measures to threaten it. Hence, the true test of the privacy judgement will be in its subsequent application to state actions when it sets boundaries and provides safeguards. This includes the Aadhaar batch of decisions which have not been comprehensively heard for more than two years. If the Supreme Court has to truly secure liberty it has to overrule ADM Jabalpur both in practice and principle.

(Source- The Indian Express)

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(August-2017)-Eastern turbulence


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Accountability and Control


Eastern turbulence

                                        - Indian Express Editorial

Just as the leaders of the Gorkhaland agitation left for Kolkata to negotiate with the West Bengal government, the Bodo areas in Assam turned restive. Protests, with an exceptionally large presence of women, blocked the national highway to Assam on Monday. Bodo groups, including the All Bodo Students Union, have renewed mobilisations around the demand for a Bodoland state.

The blockade will disrupt trade and transport links between the Northeast and the rest of India, already under stress due to the seasonal floods in the Brahmaputra basin. The economic costs of prolonged protests can be severe. Timely state intervention may help to prevent these agitations from spreading, and worse, becoming violent. The three-month-long Gorkhaland agitation has caused immense hardship to the local population. Tea and tourism, lifelines of the local economy, have almost collapsed. For a durable peace, the West Bengal government must make an offer the Gorkha Janamukti Morcha (GJM) will find difficult to refuse, and not wait for the latter to exhaust itself.

At the root of the Gorkhaland and Bodoland protests is the question of communal identity and its representation. The Gorkhas in the Darjeeling hills and the Bodos in upper Assam believe that a separate state is necessary to protect their collective social, cultural and political identities. Language and ethnicity are upheld as identity markers.

To a large extent, the logic of the separatist politics now roiling the region is inscribed in the very process by which states like West Bengal and Assam came to be constituted. The state elites and governments reinforced linguistic pride and ethnic identity of the majority or dominant groups without giving much thought to the linguistic and ethnic minorities, who were then in the peripheries of the region’s politics. When the minorities began to assert themselves, their politics, too, followed the tried and tested templates.

This cycle of identity politics needs to be broken. Going ahead, groups across the faultlines will need to re-imagine their politics in less exclusive terms. Autonomous bodies like the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration and Bodo Autonomous Council are useful instruments to deliver public goods and build physical and social infrastructure. However, they may not fully satisfy the identity aspirations of groups that seek assertion and parity. That is the unfinished work of politics in these states. West Bengal and Assam are, in reality, multi-lingual, multi-ethnic societies. If these states are reconfigured as such, it may become possible for the restive minorities — the Gorkhas, Kamtapuris, Bodos, Dimasas and so on — to negotiate their space within existing state boundaries.

(Source- The Indian Express)

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Public Administration Mains 2017 : Model Question and Answer - 36

Public Administration Mains 2017 : Model Question and Answer

(Public Administration Paper I / Chapter: Administrative Behavior)

(Important) Question : What are the problems inherent in upward communication ? (10 Marks/150 Words)

Model Answer :

Upward Communication or Subordinate-initiated communication requires a free and participative environment to facilitate sharing of perceptions, feedback, organization related experiences from the field level to the superiors and is non-directive in nature.

The challenges that come in this process is when administrators engaged in the upward communication process decides to filter information as per their discretion and do not allow unfavorable news to reach the higher bosses.

In order to address these challenges, alternate channels of communication other than the existing chain of command have to be designed. These could include suggestion systems, appeal and grievance procedures, complaint systems, counseling sessions, grapevine, group meetings or the ombudsman.

Henry Fayol has advocated a Gangplank concept in the channels of communication whereby when two individuals have to communicate across departments, instead of going through the long tedious channel of superiors. (Total Words- 138)

(Linkages : Upward Communication and Filtering of Information, Upward Communication and Grapevine, Upward Communication and Gangplank)

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Public Administration Mains 2017 : Model Question and Answer - 26

Public Administration Mains 2017 : Model Question and Answer

(Public Administration Paper II / Chapter: Union Government and Administration)

(Current Based) Question : Discuss the performance of Indian Parliament after independence. (20 Marks/250 Words)

Model Answer :

The scholars have categorized Indian Parliament as a reactive institution as it reacts to the policy proposed by executives. The performance of Parliament can be gauged by quality & quantity of decisions during a given time period. It can also be evaluated on the basis of the conduct of the houses in the formative period under various leaders.

The performance of the Parliament from being an ideal platform to express dissent and adequate participation of both the Government and opposition during Nehru’s times has slowly degenerated over a period of time. The initial parliamentarians were all scholars and experts in their domains and hence brought qualitative discussions to the table. Over time, the Members of Parliament are predominantly Generalists who lack technical knowledge needed in the domain of policy making and hence mostly stay quiet.

During Indira Gandhi’s time, the Indian Parliament reach a plummet, where to confront an uneasy opposition an emergency was declared, many opposition members were arrested and basic fundamental rights were curtailed. In the years following there has always been stiff resentment by the opposition that reduces the pace of functioning of the parliament. In the current scenario, the parliament is known for its inefficiency, to the extent that the Executive has started to bypass the legislative process in order to operate schemes. In such a situation, there needs to be greater accountability of the Executive to the Parliament and of the MP’s to the people.(Total Words- 240)

(Linkages : Parliament and Reactive Institution, Parliament and Nehru Era, Parliament and Indira Era, Parliament and Efficiency, Parliament and Need of Greater Accountability)

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Public Administration Global Journals : Theory and Methodology in the Study of Comparative Public Administration

Public Administration Global Journals : Theory and Methodology in the Study of Comparative Public Administration

INTRODUCTION: THE INTELLECTUAL ROOTS AND THEIR IMPACT ON THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATION

Source : B. Guy Peters, Theory and Methodology : Comparative Public Management

The study of comparative public administration involves elements of at least two broader strands of social inquiry. First, the principal substantive focus of comparative administration is the structure and activities of public administration and public administrators. This concern raises a number of related questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of administrative systems. In this first body of literature, the variables and subjects of investigation are either at a micro level (human behavior within organizations or between clients and administrators), or are premised on shared and largely unquestioned values of a single political system.

Although administration occurs within a particular socioeconomic and cultural setting, those external values are largely irrelevant for most studies of public administration. On the other hand, most comparative public administration examines organizational structures and administrative behavior within more than one cultural and political setting. At a minimum comparative public administration involves comparison of the administrative system in one country different from that of the researcher and involves at least an implicit comparison with the researcher’s own national system. This second intellectual root of comparative administration requires attention to questions of comparative research of all types, albeit with an emphasis on the comparison of institutions and the behavior of actors within institutions. Coming as it does from these two backgrounds, comparative public administration contains some elements of each and some of the intellectual problems of each. Further, blending the two traditions presents some additional intellectual problems.

Public Administration

First, from the perspective of public administration, there are important questions about the definition of administration and of bureaucracy and about where the researcher can delimit his or her concerns. For example, should we include political appointees in the United States as a part of “administration” because they occupy roles at the head of administrative organizations, or should we consider them as a part of the political executive (Heclo 1977; Aberbach and Rockman 1983)? Should we, in fact, include ministers with the political responsibility for managing public organizations as a part of administration, or are they better dealt with as part of the “political” government? At the other end of the spectrum, do we include clients within the system and assess the impact of their characteristics on the functioning of public organizations? To what extent should private organizations performing public functions be included as a part of administrative apparatus of government (Hood and Schuppert 1988; Milward 1991)? This question becomes even more acute as numerous scholars advocate “networks” and “polycentrism” as the best approaches to public administration (Laumann and Knoke 1987; Klijn and Teisman 1991). These are all definitional questions with substantial impacts on what we can uncover when inquiring into comparative administration.

In addition to empirical, definitional questions, there is a question of where the boundary between normative and empirical questions exists in public administration. Indeed, the fundamental question is whether there is, or should be, such a boundary. To what extent should public administration be primarily concerned with the analysis and description of existing structures? Conversely, what role should the study of public administration play in the design of new government institutions (Leemans 1976; Pollitt 1984; Lane 1990; Olsen 1990), and in changing managerial behavior within existing bureaucracies? These questions exist whether administration is being studied in the United States or any other country, but become especially acute in a comparative analysis. Public administration does have a practical and reformist side that comparative political science rarely has, at least overtly, and the important role for comparative research in policy prescription must be addressed. This is true even after the untimely demise of much of our interest in development administration (Esman 1980). Adopting a reformist and involved stance, however, quickly puts us crosswise with our more “pure,” scientific colleagues doing comparative politics and comparative sociology.

Comparative Politics

The research questions arising in comparative politics are even more vexing for the scholar. First, much of the tradition of comparative politics has been that, in practice, “comparative” means politics somewhere else, rather than an emphasis on genuine comparison; I have characterized this tendency elsewhere (1988) as the “stamps, flags and coins” approach to comparative politics. Therefore, the field has been predominantly descriptive rather than analytic. There are, of course, numerous important exceptions to that unkind generalization about the state of the field (Collier and Collier 1991). In addition, many single-country studies in comparative politics have potential theoretical importance and address theoretical issues from interesting perspectives (Power 1990). The pronounced need remains, however, to emphasize the direct comparison of political systems. This continuing need is especially damning given that comparison is the only laboratory open to most social scientists, and the generation of comparative statements appears to be the principal route to theory construction (Lijphart 1971; Dogan and Pelassy 1990). At present the comparison of administrative systems is even more primitive than the comparison of whole political systems or of other components of political systems such as elections and legislative behavior (Dalton 1988; Laundy 1989). We simply have not had either the theoretical approaches for deductive analysis (other than the ideal types mentioned below), or comparable data for inductive analysis, that might make directly comparative work in public administration readily “doable.” While the existence of usable deductive models, for example, public choice, may be questioned (Bendor 1990), it appears clear that the we have not had the databases nor the agreed conceptualizations necessary for more empirical work. Further, the relative state of ignorance of even many country and area specialists about administrative systems (sometimes including their own) implies that descriptive analyses of public administration in individual countries can be of greater value than similar descriptions of parliaments or party systems.

Associated with the descriptive character of much of comparative politics is a static quality in much of the work. The existing literature is much better at describing the status quo than it is in explaining the dynamics of the political system(s) in question. While the literature on Third World countries often has a prescriptive element concerning change and “development,” little of the literature on the First World is useful for understanding changes and particularly not for advising  governments engaged in reform efforts. This is true despite the importance of continuing efforts at change and reform in most political, and especially administrative, systems (Olsen 1990; Caiden 1991; Peters 1991). We as scholars of comparative politics are faced with massive political changes, but often appear to lack the tools or the inclination to do very much to shape those changes. To be of greater utility, therefore, comparative politics, and comparative public administration, needs to be able to speak more effectively, both descriptively and prescriptively, to the problems of change.

A final question about the study of comparative politics relevant here concerns the relationship between the systemic and individual levels of analysis (Jackman 1985). Scholars often skate between cological and individualistic fallacies and may fall into one or both. Researchers characterize whole systems and assume that individuals occupying roles within those systems behave correspondingly. On the other hand, we can characterize the behavior of individuals in political roles empirically and then assume that the encompassing systems will behave similarly. Therefore, a major challenge to comparative politics continues to be developing an ability to link the micro and the macro levels of analysis and to be able to make meaningful statements about both.

Mixing Comparative Politics and Public Administration

It should not be surprising, given the descriptions of the two fields offered above, that melding them is also difficult. One is a field (public administration) that tends to be ethnocentric, micro-level for much of its work, somewhat descriptive, but at the same time is normative and ameliorative. The other (comparative politics) is also often descriptive but presses vigorously and self-consciously toward nomothetic statements. It strives (often with limited success) not to be based solely on the experiences of industrialized democracies and to be “scientific” rather than practical or reformist in its orientation. Further, comparative politics tends to focus its attention on the macro level, and countries constitute a major unit of analysis, as well as the major (presumed) source of variance in its studies even if the data them- selves are micro-level. The flowering of comparative public administration during the heyday of development administration meant that it acquired more of a practical and reformist bent, but the roots of the field in comparative politics might make it less practical.

The variety of intellectual problems facing comparative public administration has generated numerous scholarly doubts concerning the viability of the field (Aberbach and Rockman 1983; Sigelman 1976). This current skepticism follows several decades of great optimism and enthusiasm about the contributions of, and prospects for, comparative administration. I have argued elsewhere (Peters 1988) that much of the current malaise is a function of the apparent absence of accepted and easily operational dependent variables. Published work in comparative public administration rarely looks as “scientific” as that published in other areas of  comparative inquiry. The observation of the “unscientific” nature of comparative administration often was made in contrast to the apparent successes of comparative public policy studies. Interestingly, there is now substantially more skepticism about the progress of comparative policy studies, especially that work based on easily identified and utilized quantitative data such as public expenditures. The world of public policy may actually be more complex, and require substantially greater contextual and institutional knowledge (Ostrom 1991), than has been assumed by some analysts. Rather than being peculiar to comparative public administration, the malaise of comparative studies may be a very widespread phenomenon.

Although it has more company than often thought, comparative public administration appears to remain in the doldrums (Aberbach and Rockman 1983). This apparent malaise is not a function of an absence of interest, as the recent successes of some journals and other scholarship in the field clearly indicates. Further, the connections of comparative administration to several broader strands of inquiry are not entirely disadvantageous. Although some problems are shared across these fields, some strengths are also shared. There is no lack of interest and research opportunities, but a number of important theoretical, methodological, and substantive questions remain unanswered about comparative administration. These questions must be addressed if this area of inquiry is to progress. After this perhaps excessively long preamble, I will now discuss some of those questions. As well as detailing the problems, I will try to provide at least some inklings of answers that may be beneficial for the continuing work in this field.

THEORETICAL PROBLEMS
FOR COMPARATIVE PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

The first set of questions we will raise about comparative public administration are primarily theoretical. These to some extent return to the questions already discussed (Peters 1988) about the appropriate focus of inquiry for this field of study. What are we trying to explain? What is the appropriate boundary of our study, and how does it relate to other concerns within public administration and comparative politics? We will discuss these questions from a theoretical perspective here, but any choices made about the focus of inquiry will have ramifications for the methodological stances that are required. There are some basic questions about methodology implied in the selection of theoretical foci, because certain method- ologies usually associated with the “scientific” thrust of the social sciences may be inappropriate for approaches concerned with more holistic and humanistic questions. In the complex world of administration, identifying independent and dependent variables may require as much faith as science, so that somewhat less precise methods and language may be useful.

What Do We Want to Know?

The most basic question is what do we want to know about comparative public administration? As Richard Rose once wrote, “First, Catch Your Dependent Variable.” As noted, most of the history of this field, as indeed of comparative politics more generally, has been descriptive. There are a number of excellent descriptions of the structure of administrative systems (Timsit 1987) and of the behavior of individuals within those systems (Suleiman 1974). If that were the focus of our work, we might terminate the paper here, for there would be little need for an extensive discussion of theory and methodology. Even if the focus were descriptive, however, we might have some implicit theoretical questions and associated methodological questions. Single country studies, even if descriptive, can have substantial theoretical importance if selected properly and motivated by appropriate questions (Lijphart 1975; George 1979). If, however, what we want to know is more theoretical and analytic, then theoretical and methodological problems become paramount.

If we assume for the time being that what we are after is more nomothetic statements about administrative life, then we must confront the substance of that desired knowledge. On the one hand, we may not want real comparative knowledge, but instead may be seeking universals about the behavior of individuals within public organizations. At the end of research that level of theoretical knowledge might still be the outcome if we are able to remove the nominal country titles from variables (or actually packages of variables) and assign to them other, more conceptual, names. In the short run, however, the questions remain about what can we learn within particular national or subnational contexts that can be used to build broader theoretical statements about administration and its relationship to the rest of policy-making and politics. A universal theory of public management will have to wait.

I once (Peters 1988) offered a set of four possible dependent variables—peo- ple, structures, behavior, and power—that captured some of what we would want to know. First, we need to know who is in public administration—their skills, values, and socioeconomic backgrounds. This is important not only for sociological voyeurism but also because who is there will influence what can and does happen. Also we need to know something about the structures of public organizations. Despite heroic efforts we still lack usable and comparable means of classifying the structures of government departments or of the entire populations of public organizations in a country. We also need to know what the members of the public service do, in the quotidian administration of programs and in their roles as organizational, if not partisan, politicians. Finally, we need to know something about the powers of the public service relative to other policy-making institutions and how that power is exercised in the policy process.

These are all important topics, but it is not clear that taken together they capture the essence of the administrative system of a country. Further, if we move away  from these rather simple categories, we need to ask more basic questions about administrative systems and the knowledge we need about them. Many of those questions are relational. We need to understand how administration fits with the remainder of the political system, and how it “interfaces” with the social system. The fit with the remainder of the political system goes beyond simple questions of power and goes to the match of bureaucratic elements in administration with the remainder of the system; in essence a large contingency theory question. This match is especially important in less-developed political systems but is also crucial for understanding the politics in industrialized democracies. Likewise, the issues of meshing with the social system will extend beyond administrative recruitment to consider how societal demands are processed and how decrees issued from govern- ment are processed in the social and economic system.

Level of Analysis

One of the most fundamental questions we need to ask about research in comparative public administration is at what level of analysis do we want to proceed; where will we find our dependent variable? The existing literature on public administration, or “bureaucracy,” or civil service systems, is replete with ex- amples of macro-level research. At the most basic there is an assumption that the nominal categories of countries are meaningful and useful in explaining observed variations in administrative behavior. At a somewhat lower level, the concept of bureaucracy is also macro-level and is an attempt to describe a set of structural properties of administrative systems found in (Weber presumed) developed societies or perhaps in all societies (Berger 1957; Crozier 1964; Etzioni-Halevy 1983; Page 1985; Wilson 1989). This macro-level research is important and useful, provided that our purpose is to make comparative statements about countries or statements about the impacts of the structural properties of regimes.

Likewise, the public administration literature is filled with micro-level concepts and analyses that focus attention on the individual working within the public service and on his or her behavior in office. The (by now vast) work on “images” and role perceptions in public administration (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Aberbach and Rockman 1983; Muramatsu and Krauss 1984; Campbell and Peters 1988; Mayntz and Derlien 1989) are all concerned with the attitudes and behaviors of individuals as they function within government. The managerial literature is also largely micro-oriented and is concerned with how best to motivate workers and gain their participation and compliance (Perry and Wise 1990). Finally, the literature on representative bureaucracy is largely oriented toward the collection of micro-level information. There is no right or wrong answer about what level of analysis at which to work, but the selection of one or another does imply something about the types of findings the research on comparative administration can produce.

Concentrating on macro-level of analysis, for example, directs attention to the connectedness of administrative institutions to other important social and political  institutions in society. Thus, when we focus on the macro level, we are concerned with accountability or responsibility (Day and Klein 1987) and the way in which administrative organizations are involved in the governance of their societies (Peters 1981; Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988). Further, we are concerned with the extent to which administrative organizations are embedded in the social system and reflect the characteristics of that system. Thus, for example, although the data used to study representative bureaucracy are individual level, their utility is to characterize whole systems and to say something about whether the civil service reflects the social structure from which it is drawn. These research questions are all important for understanding the civil service, or the bureaucracy, and for understanding the place of those institutions in the governing system, but they are not the only important questions about the civil service.

PROBLEMS OF LINKAGE AND CROSS-LEVEL INFERENCE

There are two elements of special importance in this discussion of the levels of analysis problem in comparative political analysis. The first is that civil service systems and the individuals who work within them are linked to a number of different elements of the social system. The civil service system, as a system, shares some of the properties of the government as a whole, and that in turn shares some attributes of the surrounding society, economy, and culture. Individuals within the civil service have some portion of their behavior determined, or at least influenced, by being members of the civil service, but their behavior is also affected by the society and their personal and professional linkages with other social institutions. This portrayal of the connections of the civil service and its members should help forestall attempts toward quick overgeneralization and determinism based primarily upon its structural or even personnel characteristics.

The embeddedness of public administration in the broader social and political systems presents difficult methodological problems. Those surrounding systems are composed of a number of properties, some of which would be measured in our analyses and many of which would not. Therefore, when we find that there is a relationship between some x and some y in our analysis, we assume that is the “real” relationship that exists. It may be, however, that the relationship is spurious and the product of some as yet unmeasured z. So many z’s are tied up in any social system that, particularly when we use countries as an implicit analytic variable, there is a very high probability of making false inferences about relationships. This is, of course, a problem in any comparative research (Ragin 1987), but is perhaps greater for comparative administration because of the multiple connections with society— politics and management—and the difficulties in measuring our dependent variables. Further, the civil service like all other social institutions will have a symbolic significance within the culture that may be difficult to understand outside the culture.

The embeddedness raises the additional troublesome ramification that some philosophers of social science (Kaplan 1964) have referred to as act meaning versus action meaning. That is, actions taken within a particular social setting may have meanings that are not the same as would be imputed by observers not fully familiar with that social system. Thus, similar behaviors taken by an American and a Dutch civil servant might signal different things to other members of their organizations. The research methods needed for effective research on the civil service might therefore be more those of the “squat anthropologist” than the more conventional social science researcher. That is, we may need to do as Kaufman (1981) did and virtually live the lives of our subjects to gain greater insight into their administrative behavior.

In addition to the general problem of action meaning, in a political setting such as that inhabited by civil servants, there may be multiple meanings for any set of actions as the individual is engaged in multiple “games” (Tseblis 1990) that are a function of his or her multiple roles in a public bureaucracy. Even without the rationalistic logic embodied in much of this literature, these multiple and often conflicting linkages across levels and across segments of roles (Peters 1991) can be crucial for interpreting behavior within institutions. Thus, the need to contextualize administrative behavior not only within the society but even within the multiple roles and games of the average senior civil servant makes understanding outcomes of the process that much more difficult for outsiders. This will again require close observation of behavior within context, rather than the more conventional survey and descriptive analyses.

Although we need to keep our analysis at the appropriate level, it is also important to remember the interactions among levels. This is especially true when we remain cognizant of the fact that citizens and private organizations (firms or whatever), are also important components of the administrative system. Most systems models of social and political life include a feedback loop that links actions back to inputs, and for public administration the loop is usually closed through citizens. The outputs and consequences of administrative action may be individual (benefits denied, regulations not enforced, or whatever) but the cumulation of those actions may be systemic. Thus, when we attempt to measure the individual behaviors of civil servants vis à vis clients, which is certainly an important aspect of administrative behavior and administrative outputs, we may also be measuring some items that are of great consequence for the entire political system.

The second error that is important is to guard against the tendency to make improper inferences across levels of analysis. There is a common tendency in social research, and not just research about public administration, to make such unjustified inferential leaps (Robinson 1950; Retzlaff 1965). It is all too easy to assume that if the majority of individuals, or perhaps even all individuals, occupying roles in an administrative system think and behave in certain ways, the system will then behave in a similar manner. Bureaucrats may think in certain ways, but it is not always certain that the bureaucracy will function in that manner. Given the traditions of comparative politics characterizing entire systems, the ecological fallacy is even more common, and researchers assume that because they can characterize the system as a system, the individuals within it will behave as they should. This is often the case, but by no means is it always the case, and deviance from the prescribed roles may be extremely important in explaining some aspects of the behavior of the system, most especially the ability to produce change.

The growth of public choice approaches to political phenomena has made the question of cross-level inferences even more important. The question of “methodological individualism” is especially evident in the work of scholars such as William Niskanen (1971) who posit that “budget maximizing bureaucrats” dominate bureaucracies and determine the outcomes of administrative decision making. There are numerous critiques and elaborations of this basic model (Jackson 1982; Blais and Dion 1991), and it holds sway over a good deal of thinking in the field. The reason that it is mentioned here is that it illustrates problems of cross-level inferences. The model assumes that micro-level motivations (budget maximization), if existant among top-level bureaucrats, define systemic properties. It appears, however, that the structural characteristics of regimes and civil service systems within which these purported maximizers operate have as much or more impact on the actual performance of the system (Peters 1991).

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(July-2017)-Individual vs group


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Current Development


Individual vs group

                                        (The Indian Express Editorial)

The Maharashtra Prohibition of People from Social Boycott (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act (2016), which received presidential assent last week, is an acknowledgement of a basic principle of citizenship and justice: The social contract in a modern democracy is between the state and the citizen, and crime and punishment must be defined between these two parties.

Like in many other parts of India, caste panchayats in Maharashtra have wielded extra-judicial authority and Indian citizens have been ostracised, even killed by “community” actors despite breaking no laws. That the BJP-led Devendra Fadnavisgovernment has criminalised such actions is a welcome first step. Moving forward, it needs to politically address the climate of prejudice and intolerance that forms the backdrop of a community justice that encourages vigilantism and exclusion.

The Social Boycott Act was brought in in response to sustained movements provoked by atrocities against individuals by gaviks or caste panchayats in Maharashtra. A large number of these incidents were in response to inter-caste marriages. Four years ago, the “honour killing” of Pramila Khumbharkar sparked outrage and murdered rationalist Narendra Dhabolkar was among those who led the movement demanding legislation that specifically tackles feudal forms of mob and vigilante justice.

The new law addresses loopholes in existing laws that were used to thwart justice. For example, it ensures that trials are completed within six months from the date a report is first filed. The Act also penalises individuals or groups who try to prevent others from accessing places of worship, certain professions or even certain forms of dress and public behaviour. In essence, the law asserts the freedom of the individual over the social group they belong to. The legislation does, however, fall short when it comes to addressing inter-community social ostracism — for example, the denial of housing to minorities, or attacks on them for their diet and dress.
While the Indian Constitution has given a pride of place to individual rights, the unit of public discourse and political practice has often been the social group. In debates on caste injustice, secularism, women’s rights and even access to public spaces, it is the ascriptive identity rather than the notion of the individual liberty that is often at the forefront.

The Fadnavis government, in addition to legislation, must now take the lead in changing the tenor of public discourse. It cannot be seen to, for example, legitimise, even tacitly, vigilantism and violence in the name of cow protection, or impose dietary restrictions in the name of “community sentiments”. That, as much as the law itself, will display a political will to safeguard the rights of every citizen.
(Source- The Indian Express)
 

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Competition Wizard Magazine (August 2017)

Competition Wizard Magazine (August 2017)

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(July-2017)-The People Are Watching


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Ethics and Integrity


The People Are Watching

                                        - By Rakshita Swamy

In contrast to its rhetoric, the current government’s record on transparency, accountability, and citizen participation has been uninspiring. Even essential laws such as the Lok Pal and the Whistle Blower Protection Act are yet to be operationalised. However, recent developments on social audits, the conduct of which actually finds a place in the BJP’s 2014 manifesto, open up an opportunity.
The recent report of a joint task force on social audit has made unanimous recommendations that have opened the possibilities of social audit becoming a vibrant, independent and citizen-based monitoring system. The Supreme Court too in an ongoing PIL has taken a note of these recommendations and is exploring strengthening social audit as a systemic solution in law.

With its roots in rural Rajasthan, social audits refer to a legally mandated process where potential and existing beneficiaries evaluate the implementation of a programme by comparing official records with ground realities. The public collective platforms of jansunwais or public hearings that social audits conclude with remain its soul. In the course of a social audit, individuals and communities get empowered and politicised in a way that they experience the practical potential of participatory democracy.

The proceedings cannot be scripted, and the entire social audit is often a dramatic process of redistribution of power based on evidence and fact. For instance, when it is publicly read out that many workers who worked under the MGNREGA are still waiting for their wages, whereas family members of the sarpanch who never visited, let alone worked on a NREGA worksite, receive uninterrupted wage payments into their bank accounts, the reaction could range from anger to a firm determination for answers.

It is important to build on the current momentum. Where social audits have been able to take place effectively, they have served as an important tool to detect corruption and influence redress. Nearly Rs 100 crore has been identified as misappropriated funds through social audits under the MGNREGA, out of which nearly Rs 40 crore has been recovered. Nearly 6,000 field personnel have been implicated/removed from duty based on findings of social audits. The impact of continuous cycles of social audit in deterring potential corruption is beyond quantification.

However, not all is rosy and hurdle free. Institutionalisation on the ground has been inadequate, and has faced great resistance from the establishment. The lack of adequate administrative and political will in institutionalising social audit to deter corruption has meant that social audits in many parts of the country are not independent from the influence of implementing agencies. Social audit units, including village social audit facilitators, continue to face resistance and intimidation and find it difficult to even access primary records for verification.

In spite of challenges, social audit moved tentatively, but surely towards becoming an accepted part of audit, and a discipline in itself. Nothing demonstrates that better than the fact the Comptroller and Auditor General in 2016 laid down “auditing standards” for social audit. This, as the CAG office states in the introduction is, “the first ever such exercise for the formulation of standards for social audit in the world”. It is indicative of a remarkable trajectory in the expanding theoretical and practical framework of social audit over the past two decades.

In an age where phrases such as open data and open government are used in any conversation around governance, social audits should serve as a critical point of reference. An open and transparent system involves the presence of real platforms for people to be informed by official statements and records, with an opportunity to compare that with ground realities. Websites and twitter handles run by the government cannot replace the responsibility of the state to set up, fund, and foster practical processes and mechanisms.

The government can decide to use these interventions and harness peoples’ energies in facing the vast challenge of implementation and monitoring. Or it can choose to be reluctantly pushed along. Social audit is no longer a choice. Along with other transparency and accountability platforms, it is a legal, moral, and democratic necessity The writer works with peoples’ campaigns and government on social accountability practices. She has worked with the Ministry of Rural Development on social audit
(Source- The Indian Express)

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Yojana Magazine (August 2017)

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Public Administration Global Journals : The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy - An Overview

Public Administration Global Journals : The Scientific Study of Bureaucracy - An Overview

The Foundations of the Scientific Study of Public Bureaucracy

The study of bureaucracy is the analysis of how administrative agencies function as organizations within a governmental system. The study in- cludes interinstitutional relationships with democratic institutions such as chief executives, legislatures, or the judiciary as well as intrainstitu- tional activities concerned with explaining the organizational structure and behavior of administrative agencies. Scientific inquiry pertains to the development of systematic, generalizable explanations and subsequent empirical tests of the “what, how, and why” of bureaucratic agencies. This book contains essays that emphasize theory building and empirical test- ing of theories, theories of interest to students of public administration within political science. Our primary concern is how public bureaucracies operate in a democracy.

The study of bureaucracy within political science has an intellectual history that harkens back over a century. German sociologist Max Weber’s (1947) notion that maintaining a “rational-legal authority” was the appropriate way to conduct the business of governance was both a norma- tive and an empirical theory. He advocated the basis for general explana- tions regarding how bureaucratic institutions should be designed, including the need for a division of labor, career personnel with specialized training and expertise, hierarchical formal organizational structures that do not duplicate other administrative units, and explicit rules and procedures to ensure clear lines of authority and accountability within the organization. This work has had a profound impact on our theoretical un- derstanding of how superior-subordinate relationships within such organizations actually play out (e.g., Barnard 1938; Brehm and Gates 1997; Crozier 1964; Cyert and March 1963; Downs 1967; March and Simon 1958; Miller 1992; Simon 1947; Tullock 1965).

Similarly, Woodrow Wilson’s (1887) argument for an administrative apparatus that is devoid of politics and meddling arose from a normative concern of the era that American bureaucracy served as a bastion for political patronage (Nelson 1982; Skowronek 1982). Wilson’s call for an independent administrative state not beholden to the particularistic in- terests of elected officials reflects issues of theoretical interest in understanding the role and functioning of bureaucracy within our American democracy that range from whether the bureaucracy responds to political control from electoral institutions (e.g., Moe 1982, 1985; Weingast and Moran 1983; Wood and Waterman 1994) to the importance of profes- sional expertise in policy administration (Eisner 1991; Khademian 1992; Mosher 1968).

Goodnow, Taylor, and Gulick: The Progressive Era

The early American study of bureaucracy finds its roots in the work of Goodnow, Gulick, and Taylor rather than that of Weber and Wilson. The influence of both Weber and Wilson, substantial as it was, came late to scholars of administration. Weber was not translated into English until 1946 (Weber 1946, 1947) and therefore his work was relatively in- accessible. Similarly, Wilson’s original essay disappeared from the literature until it was republished in 1941 (Van Riper 1983).

Goodnow (1900) also proposed a politics-administration dichotomy; he considered these to be two different functions but recognized that in practice politics was rarely separate from administration. This distinction became part of the progressive philosophy in public service training and was incorporated in the field’s first textbook (White 1926). The functional division allowed progress on two dimensions. On the administrative side, efforts were made to study implementation and the processes of bureau- cracy in a scientific manner. On the political side, the focus was on de- signing governmental institutions, that is, creating the institutions that would formulate, adopt, and implement policy. The latter was inherently prescriptive. This effort (known as the study of the separation of powers) continued to occupy the time of public administration scholars until the
1950s (Waldo 1984, chap. 7; Appleby 1949).

On the administrative side, efforts were made to discover the principles of administration, the one best way to design a work process or structure an organization. Work process design is most closely associated with the work of Fredrick W. Taylor (1919), who used experiments to determine how jobs should be structured. Taylor advocated a division of tasks with management charged with designing the optimal work processes and individual workers charged with responding based on the incentives offered for production. Taylor’s controversial motivation theory, the reliance on piecework and pure economic incentives, drew attention away from his scientific, albeit atheoretical, approach and generated skep- ticism (including a congressional investigation) about the contribution of Taylor (see Henry 1995, 55–56).

Taylor’s experimental approach also generated the first empirical challenge to this type of inquiry with Western Electric’s Hawthorne experiments. Those experiments demonstrated how human factors and relationships subverted material incentives (see Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939). Although scholars of public administration paid little attention to this work after the Hawthorne experiments, the fields of industrial engi- neering and operations research continue within the tradition of Taylor and the Hawthorne experiments.

A second stream of work went beyond production processes to exam- ine how to structure organizations such as specialization, span of control, unity of command, and similar factors (Gulick and Urwick 1937; Fayole 1949). The method of analysis was observation rather than systematic data collection and analysis (for an early attempt at formal theory, see Stene 1940). Despite an impressive set of principles, Gulick (1937) him- self lamented the lack of research supporting the principles and sketched out a research design to determine how one of them, span of control, could be systematically verified. That research agenda remained untouched, however. Simon’s (1947) devastating critique of the “proverbs of administration” effectively ended this approach to the science of administration within public administration.

The work of Progressive Era scholars arguing for a scientific approach to administration gave way to the behavioral revolution in the study of or- ganizations. The intellectual roots of this revolution can be traced to Barnard’s (1938) The Functions of the Executive, in which issues of authority relating to superior-subordinate relationships were analyzed. Central to Barnard’s argument are joint issues: (1) what motivates bureaucrats to be- have as they do? and (2) why are they willing to sacrifice their individual goals and belong to an organization? This line of inquiry sought to develop generalizable theoretical principles to facilitate our understanding of how administrative agencies make decisions rather than emphasizing nor- mative descriptions as to how administrative agencies should function as entities in their own right and within a larger governmental system.

Simon’s (1947) classic Administrative Behavior focused on individuals as the key unit of analysis in order to understand how organizations per- form. The two major cornerstones of this work were an emphasis on (1) providing a theory of administration centered on efficiency and (2) analyzing the nature of information processing by bureaucratic organizations by asserting that individuals’ cognitive limitations did not allow for rational-comprehensive decision making. The latter subject is developed in March and Simon’s (1958) Organizations, in which the rational- comprehensive method is shown to be empirically unrealistic and theoretically ungrounded. This stream of work also emphasized how routines (standard operating procedures [SOPs]) could be employed to overcome uncertainty and individual cognitive limitations and allow individuals in organizations to behave in a more efficient manner (Cyert and March 1963). Within this intellectual stream, Cyert and March attack the foun- dations of the neoclassical theory of the firm by maintaining that organizations are not optimizers in the traditional sense of maximizing profits. Instead, organizations behave inefficiently in a strict microeconomic sense since they will accrue slack resources.

Constitutional Perspectives

As the administrative science side of public administration focused on management and organizational questions, a parallel movement grappled with the issue of how to fit bureaucracy into the Constitution. The key challenge was reconciling the policy-making discretion of nonelected bureaucrats with the imperatives of democracy. Scholars were well aware of bureaucracy’s potential to subvert democratic ends; Herring’s (1936) work on bureaucratic power documented the ability of bureaucracy to engage in politics and shape the direction of public policy.

This debate was effectively framed by an exchange between Carl Friedrich and Herman Finer. Friedrich (1940) challenged the notion that elected officials could control the bureaucracy. Foreshadowing future principal-agent concerns about information asymmetry, Friedrich focused on the influx of scientists in government and how the possession of technical knowledge made political control difficult. In such a situation, the potential for a bureaucrat to dress his or her policy preferences in the guise of expertise was high. Friedrich’s solution was a fellowship of sci- ence whereby competing sets of scientists would serve as a check on each other and thus provide multiple viewpoints for politicians.

Finer (1941) responded critically to this proposal, arguing that democ- racy was the preeminent value, not one on a par with technical compe- tence. Finer contended that democratic institutions had sufficient methods with which to control bureaucracy and therefore abrogating their political responsibility was not necessary. The Friedrich-Finer debate established two competing camps on the question of bureaucracy and democracy—the proponents of overhead democracy or control by political institutions (Finer 1941; see also Hyneman 1950; Key 1959; Redford 1969; and Wood and Waterman 1994)—and the proponents of the inner check or competition, ethics, participation, and so on (Friedrich 1940; see also Long 1952; Dahl 1970; Appleby 1952; and Frederickson 1997).

Significant for the development of public administration was the publication of Waldo’s (1946, 1984) Administrative State. Waldo considered himself a normative theorist and generally eschewed empirical questions for normative ones. His approach provided a place for scholars not interested in the behavioral revolution but still concerned about the relationship between bureaucracy and democratic institutions.

Research questions in this area were not only concerned with how the bureaucracy fit into constitutional governance (e.g., Rohr 1986) but also with alternative views of the constitutional chain of command. The separation of powers in the United States made the establishment of clear lines of bureaucratic authority difficult (Appleby 1949), a topic later known as the multiple principals problem. Although most scholars ac- cepted the notion of presidential hierarchy in terms of the bureaucracy, a sizable group of scholars defended the constitutional preeminence of Congress (Rosenbloom 2000; Hyneman 1950; Key 1959). Accepting a Congress-centered view of the Constitution with regard to bureaucracy has clear implications for how the bureaucracy should relate to other po- litical institutions (see Rosenbloom 2000).

Of the inner check proposals, one, representative bureaucracy, is of particular interest because it developed and tested a systematic body of midrange empirical theory of public bureaucracy. Representative bu- reaucracy in a nutshell contends that a bureaucracy representative of the general public in demographic terms is likely to produce policies gener- ally in accord with public preferences. The logic of the theory was first set forth by Long (1952), although he made no effort to test it. Critical tests and theoretical reformations came later (Meier and Nigro 1976; Rosenbloom and Featherstonhaugh 1977; Saltzstein 1979). A consistent body of empirical literature now indicates when and under what condi- tions passive representative (demographic similarity) might lead to active representation (policy congruence) in terms of race, ethnicity, and gen- der (Selden 1997; Meier 1993b).

Bureaucratic Pathologies and the Public Choice Approach to Administrative Organizations

Public choice approaches to the study of organizations focus on problems of control and responsiveness. Using economic tools of analysis, this brand of research analyzes the pathologies of the administrative state and their implications for organizational performance. Tullock’s (1965) work on hierarchical distortion posited the pernicious effects of mis- information that can be channeled both horizontally and, even more critically, vertically through administrative organizations. According to Tullock, agency efforts to combat information flow problems within organizations are essentially futile since “authority leakages” are both inevitable and cumulative.
In his classic treatise The Bureaucratic Phenomenon, Crozier (1964) ar- rived at conclusions similar to Tullock’s. Rather than focusing on infor- mation flows, Crozier viewed the crux of the problem confrontin administrative agencies as being centered on the question, How is power allocated within bureaucratic organizations? Crozier argued that orga- nizations reflect imperfect social compromises that arise in bargaining among individuals and groups. Specifically, the organizational design, structure, and operation are not randomly determined but reflect an equilibrium agreement among actors and stakeholders behaving in a purposeful manner.
Both Tullock and Crozier separately conclude that bureaucratic agencies are sufficiently ossified that they require abolishment. This lack of responsiveness to constituency demands, whether it be from elected officials, citizens, or pressure groups, is attributable to bureaucratic in- ertia that occurs within the organizational setting. Subsequent work by Niskanen (1971) extended this work on the limitations of administrative governance. Niskanen’s central claim is that bureaucracy is preoccupied with resource (budget) maximization and that its monopoly power over the distribution (administration) of the supply of public goods and services made it inefficient and unresponsive to both citizen and politician preferences.

One notable departure from this malignant view of bureaucratic pathologies is Downs’s Inside Bureaucracy (1967). He argues that individ- ual bureaucrats have different preference structures, thus making effective coordination and policy-making difficult. He extends the behavioral tra- dition, describing different behaviors exhibited by zealots, advocates, statesmen, conservers, and climbers. The implication of these bureaucratic personality types is that communication channels in bureaucratic organi- zations will be muddled and will lead to performance distortions. Downs contends that bureaucratic pathologies can be corrected by finding the proper mix of agency personnel types, adopting extraorganizational means such as reorganization, obtaining feedback on its performance from out- side sources, or creating overlapping administrative responsibilities to en- courage competition and discourage subordinate collusion.

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Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(July-2017)-A remarkable public servant


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Polity And Governance Issues


A remarkable public servant

                                        - by K. SHANKAR BAJPAI

Naresh Chandra’s passing has occasioned many tributes; none can do him justice. His virtues, capabilities and accomplishments were exceptional. For one person to combine all — and succeed, where such qualities are hardly appreciated — was unique. Herman Finer believed “the primary duty of a civil servant is to provide the influence of fact upon desire,” but in our system facts are unwelcome. Naresh considered objective assessments and advice sacrosanct, and had the skills to make them effective. That rarest asset — sound common sense — was fine-tuned with a shrewd sense of realism, feasibility and political compulsion, without ever impairing dedication to state and society as his overriding duty. Most unusual of all was his sense of humour, seeing it in situations and human absurdities, and employing it in his own interactions.
His service years were distinguished in home matters, but his post-retirement assignment, as Ambassador in Washington, added further laurels. We foreign servicers, not unnaturally, resent outsiders taking our jobs, but he won our liking as well as respect, displaying all those additional degrees of acumen, understanding and tact associated with diplomacy. His impressive capacity for strategic thinking enabled him to analyse our country’s needs in this turbulent world, free of the more naïve and yet condescending prejudices still, alas, hanging around. He left an excellent report, commissioned and ignored by the government, on updating the concepts and mechanics of handling India’s security challenges. Our debt to Naresh should make us at least revive attention to it.

I only met Naresh after I retired, but then grew close in work and in friendship. Having both served as ambassadors in Washington, chairmen of the National Security Advisory Board, and for over a decade in our team in a major extra-official international dialogue, we found much to share professionally. Predecessors and successors are not, among us, famous for thinking well of each other, but we got on famously. Most recently, we had a growing concern about our increasingly dysfunctional instruments of state. Mine is an extensively civil-service background — father, two uncles, brother, nephews, niece. Like Naresh, I take pride in government service, convinced it is vital to our state and society. But we both also believed in taking a good look at ourselves: The highest form of loyalty to one’s service is objective self-analysis, leading to self-correction.
For civil servants to imagine their cadres are perfect, they themselves even more so, is to invite decay. Our entire apparatus of government today is a shambles, with sloppiness, disregard of duty and of standards, decline in intellectual calibre no less than moral qualities, seriously damaging the state and society that public servants are supposed to serve, as Naresh so outstandingly did.

Like many others, Naresh found Delhi unhealthy — in many senses — moving to Goa for long stretches. He did keep revisiting, and we planned to meet in October to work out a project for somehow remedying both the political and in-service causes of civil-service decay. Particularly worrying was our existing arrangements for attending to our defence challenges, with the modernisation of our defence ministry an urgent priority. That it cannot, in today’s world, be treated as another generalist outpost is obvious to everyone except apparently those who are responsible for manning it: It must be given expertise, continuity and the highest political management — not treated as a part-time occupation. And similar reforms are due in all departments and services.

The problem lies both with our political masters and the permanent services. Each blames the other, but both work to debase the system. Political leaders everywhere like to get their way, unfettered by any institutional or procedural — or moral — constraints; but in well-run countries a modicum of self-control and self-discipline prevails. State governments are the worst — hundreds of civil servants transferred by whim, open favouritism and brow-beating. It is a wonder so many good people manage to remain good civil servants. But for how long? The rot spread long ago to the central government. It is rooted in the arrogant disregard of norms by politicians, and furthered by human weaknesses — including just plain incompetence — among bureaucrats.

Whether reservations have served any other purpose is dubious, but they certainly haven’t helped administrative efficiency. Nor does it help to mount witch-hunts whenever something goes wrong. There will always be wrong-doers in any system and any country, but it is by no means beyond human ingenuity to impose objective, impersonal methods and limit wrong-doing. It is notorious that the shadow of Bofors drives out all decisions — nobody wants to be blamed — and without any time limit.

Our country faces many more challenges than we seem conscious of. Two states, both nuclear-armed, have major claims on our territory, apart from other unwelcome designs. The international setting is becoming more dangerous, our vulnerabilities increase. Our prime minister has shown remarkable imagination and finesse in international affairs, but everything ultimately depends on the efficiency of the state’s machinery. Naresh Chandra was both a great believer in and exemplar of this. More than praise, he deserves emulation. Let’s hope that government starts making that possible.
(Source- The Indian Express)

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Kurukshetra Magazine (August 2017)

 Kurukshetra Magazine (August 2017)

Magazine Name: Kurukshetra Magazine

Month: August 2017

File Type: Printed Magazine

Current-Public-Administration-Magazine-(July-2017)-No state of exception


Sample Material of Current Public Administration Magazine

Accountability and Control


No state of exception

                                        - Indian Express Editorial

The Supreme Court’s direction to the CBI on Friday to probe nearly a hundred alleged extra-judicial killings in Manipur underlines a welcome intent to shine the light on the shadowy world of counter-insurgency operations in the northeastern states. Fighting terrorism is no doubt an arduous task, but evidence seems to suggest that, all too often, security forces tend to ignore due process during operations and seek legal protection under laws like the Armed Forces Special Powers Act to relegate complaints of rights violations.

When the PIL filed by Extra Judicial Execution Victims Families Association, seeking a probe and compensation in 1,528 alleged extra-judicial killings in Manipur from 2000 to 2012 by security forces and police, came up for hearing in the Supreme Court, the Centre had pleaded that the security forces be exempted from any probe since the alleged killings were not premeditated murders but “cases of military operations”.

The army went one step further to allege local bias in the judicial inquiries that indicted its men while pleading that FIRs cannot be registered against its personnel in insurgency-hit areas like Manipur and Jammu and Kashmir. The court, however, has made it amply clear that security operations even in “disturbed areas” are not beyond the pale of law. The AFSPA, a relic of the colonial imagination that saw all dissenters as enemies of the state, empowers security personnel to override the civil administration in “disturbed areas”. Courts and commissions, in light of the Act’s operational history, have proposed elaborate measures to prevent its abuse. The Manipur petition, however, suggests that the security forces — in this case, the army, Assam Rifles and Manipur Police — may not have always followed them.

The Supreme Court’s persistence in unveiling the truth about the cases the PIL has highlighted, is admirable. Soon after the petition was admitted, the court set up a commission under Justice Santosh Hegde to examine six cases, which found that the encounters were not genuine. Last year, the SC, while ruling that the AFSPA does not allow the security forces to use excessive force, privileged the rights and freedoms of citizens over the government’s claim that investigating complaints against security personnel would dampen their morale.

In April, the court ordered an SIT to probe three cases of rape and murder. Now, an additional 97 encounters are to be probed and the CBI has been told to complete the investigation by December 31, 2017. The message from the court is unambiguous: There can’t be any state of exception when it comes to respecting the rights and freedoms of its citizens.
(Source- The Indian Express)

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Yojana Magazine (July 2017)

Yojna Magazine (July 2017)

Magazine Name: Yojna Magazine

Month: July 2017

File Type: Printed Magazine

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