Deterrence or danger?

Mains Paper 2: Science and Technology
Prelims level: Nuclear triad
Mains level: Awareness in the fields of IT, Space, Computers, robotics, nano-technology, bio-technology

Context

•  It has been universally recognised that the sole justification for having nuclear weapons is their deterrence value.
•  If ever a nuclear bomb has to be used, it has destroyed its raison d’être.
•  The initiation of a nuclear attack would mean utter destruction, not just for the two parties involved but also for regions far beyond.
•  The Americans got away with their bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however controversial it was, because they had a monopoly of nukes at the time.
•  Today, the situation is vastly different and far more dangerous.
•  If nuclear weapons fail to deter the outbreak of war involving use of such weapons, they have disastrously failed in their deterrence mission.

A nuclear triad

•  The major nuclear weapon powers, principally the U.S., have developed the myth of a nuclear triad, that consists of land-based, air-based and sea-based nuclear delivery systems.
•  The theory is that if country A initiates a nuclear attack on country B in a first strike, country B must be in a position, even after absorbing the nuclear strike, to retaliate with a massive nuclear attack on the enemy country.
•  This is called second strike capability.
•  The rationale for the naval leg of the triad is its survivability.
•  The argument in favour of the naval leg is not that it makes the deterrent more credible, but that, as mentioned above, it will survive for retaliation.
•  In the event that an enemy initiates a nuclear strike, it will never be able to destroy all the land and air-based nuclear weapons of the target country.
•  The enemy might attack population centres and not nuclear weapon sites; in that case, all the nukes of the target country would be available for retaliation.
•  In either case, the deterrence capability of the target country would remain intact. If the possession of the naval leg were to deter the enemy, ab initio, from initiating a nuclear launch, it would add to the deterrence value.
•  If the hostilities reach the threshold where a country may consider using nuclear weapons, it would be preceded by a period of conventional warfare.
•  The enemy would also have to reach the conclusion that unless he uses his nuclear weapons, he would suffer a defeat that he simply cannot afford to let happen.
•  A conventional conflict itself will not start before several days of negotiations, including possible mediation by external powers and the UN Security Council.
•  Even a small incident involving India and Pakistan would immediately invite big powers to rush in and mediate pull-back of forces, etc.
•  The external interventions succeed or not in preventing a major war, the target country would have ample time to disperse its land and air-based nuclear assets.
•  The naval leg does not seem indispensable.

The case of Pakistan

•  One does not know if it has a nuclear doctrine, but even if it does not have one, that by itself does not make it an irresponsible nuclear power.
•  Pakistan has rejected the no-first-use policy and has in fact said that it would not rule out using nukes if it felt compelled to do so in a war.
•  It claims to have so-called tactical nuclear weapons which can presumably be used in a battle field. Pakistan, in other words, keeps the option of using nuclear weapons first as a deterrent against a conventional attack by India. India’s stand is clear.
•  Any use of nuclear weapon, tactical or otherwise, will invite massive retaliation by India which would have disastrous consequences for Pakistan. (Will India remain unaffected by radiation, etc?
•  Can we guarantee that the winds will not blow in our direction?
•  The radiation, debris, heat, blast, etc will be carried well beyond the belligerents’ borders.)
•  So, even assuming that we will have the political and moral will to unleash the full force of our nukes, how does acquiring SSBNs or a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine make our deterrent more credible?

Way forward

•  China is far ahead of India in many respects. It has more warheads and more nuclear-powered submarines.
•  Both India and China have repeatedly declared adherence to the no-first-use doctrine. The justification for acquiring the naval leg of the triad? We have a territorial dispute with China, but both countries have acquired enough experience to manage and contain the conflict.
•  It is reasonably safe to say that there will not be an all-out war involving the use of nuclear weapons between India and China.
•  One of the arguments in the 1960s and 1970s in favour of atom bombs was that they would be cheaper in the long run.
•  The acquisition of expensive conventional platforms as well as the ever expanding nuclear programme has destroyed that argument.
•  India has been in the forefront in campaign for nuclear disarmament. Let us not at least escalate a nuclear arms race in our region.

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Prelims Questions:

Q.1) India has completed its nuclear triad by inducting the strategic nuclear submarine INS Arihant into service. Consider the following statements accordingly-
1. With this, India has become the third country to have a nuclear triad after U. S and Russia
2. INS Arihant is India’s first indigenously built nuclear submarine

Choose the appropriate code
a) 1 Only
b) 2 Only
c) Both 1 and 2
d) Neither 1 nor 2

Answer: B

Mains Questions:
Q.1) Will Arihant make us more secure, and if so, in what way?