The evolving peace process in Afghanistan (The Hindu)

Mains Paper 2: International Relations
Prelims level: International Criminal Court
Mains level: Measures taken towards peace process in Afshanistan

Context

• In the last 18 years, the situation in Afghanistan has remained as tenuous as it had been in the three decades that preceded them.
• Since 2017 when the so-called “mother-of-all-bombs” was dropped in Nangarhar to deter the extremists.
• Or in 2001 when 25 international stakeholders came together “determined to help the Afghan people end the tragic conflicts in their country...”

American push for peace and reconciliation

• The American push for peace and reconciliation has been contrasted by its stance on justice and accountability.
• What could have been a massive trial of crimes against humanity (allegedly) committed by the members of American military and intelligence on Afghan soil, the US arm-twisted its way out of this situation at the International Criminal Court (ICC).
• By “threatening reprisals” against the ICC and cancelling the visa of the chief prosecutor of the ICC, Fatou Bensouda, the US ensured that the proposed investigation against it and “its allies” was dropped, even as 1.17 million statements were submitted to the Court in connection with the alleged crimes.
• While the US has demonstrated a flippant, self-contradictory attitude from time-to-time, the man of the hour in the present scenario, Zalmay Khalilzad US Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation inspires little confidence.
• From (effectively) sabotaging the return of Zahir Shah as the political leader of Afghanistan in 2001 to his purported negotiations with then-President Hamid Karzai to be made (an unaccountable) Prime Minister of Afghanistan in 2009 to his successive engagements with the Taliban since 1990s, Khalilzad has a checkered past.
• The US, itself, seems to take two steps backwards for every step it takes forward. For example, President Obama’s 2011 contrarian commands, along with the surge, had given a deadline for American troops to exit Afghanistan.
• In any counter-insurgency situation, the insurgents have the time even if the counter-insurgents have the most advanced watch. The US wants to get out of Afghanistan, and it must. It just does not know how.

Is India turning the tide?

• In what appears to be a prelude to a shift in India’s effective stance towards Afghanistan, we are witnessing a change in discourse.
• Following the controversial “reorganisation” of the Indian province of Jammu and Kashmir (J and K), speculations have been aplenty about the intended audience of this internal act.
• The internal reorganisation of J and K was more than a mere attempt at setting the house straight.
• It is said that India had the geo-political space to tinker with the political make-up of what is essentially a disputed territory, knowing full well the bilateral and even international ripples it might create.

The JandK move

• The Indian move in JandK most likely, then, came as a reaction to President Trump’s unsolicited mediation offers.
• The drummed-up narrative on national security, which became the pretext for positioning as many as 38,000 extra troops in the region, were meant for something more than just maintaining uneasy calm in the Kashmir Valley, but to decouple Kashmir from Afghanistan.
• With Pakistan stopped in its tracks, India appeared to be ready for another move an (indirect) outreach to the Taliban.
• Although not entirely independent of the Pakistani influence, Shakti Sinha (Afghanistan’s Ex-Head, UN Governance and Development) conceded that the Taliban ought to be recognised for what it is worth a group that has been granted legitimacy not only by international stakeholders, but by Afghans themselves.
• He further added that the mainstreaming of the Taliban could potentially make them mend their ways since they will be constrained by formal regulations and commitments.
• Drawing a fine line between engagement and endorsement, the discourse that seems to be shaping up is one in which India is projecting itself as a partner that no Afghan actor should do without.
• It went on to say that one should not be on the wrong side of India, demonstrating a more robust and confident line of thought vis-à-vis the situation in Afghanistan.
• This statement has been interpreted in two contrasting ways.
• On one hand, it is said to be directed at India, which, in exerting its dominance over Kashmir, appears to have leveraged its move to outwit Pakistan in Afghanistan, thereby unwittingly connecting Kashmir and Afghanistan.
• On the other, it can be read as a prelude to the aforementioned change in the Indian narratives, signalling that the process of engagement with the Taliban has, perhaps, already been under way.Conclusion
• As a peace deal looks more realistic than ever before, it is advisable for India to not be as diffident as it had once been.
• The situation in Afghanistan has often been described as a “line in the sand,” one which changes too often. India needs to be agile in “playing the game.”
• It knowing full well it will have to walk on eggshells as it changes course.
• However, basking in the goodwill it has generated in Afghanistan, it can be assured that a change in approach will be received kindly by the larger Afghan population, which is both embracing and resigning itself to the unfolding changes.

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Prelims Questions:

Q.1) Consider the following statements about Financial Stability and Development Council (FSDC)
1. The Chairman of the FSDC is the Finance Minister of India.
2. Heads of SEBI, IRDA, RBI, and PFRDA are members of the FSDC.

Which of the above statement/s is/are correct?
a) 1 Only
b) 2 Only
c) Both 1 and 2
d) Neither 1 nor 2

Correct Answer: C
Mains Questions:
Q.1) From India’s standpoint, New Delhi would do well to engage with the Taliban, which is being accorded increasing legitimacy. Critically examine the statement.