A year after Balakot (Indian Express)

Mains Paper 2: International Relations
Prelims level: Balakot operation
Mains level: Effects of Balakot operation in Indian subcontinent

Context:

• Pakistan’s deep state took a major risk in executing the Pulwama attack.
• The comprehensive Indian approach towards conflict management initiated since 2017 could effectively prevent it from further calibration of the situation in Kashmir. An element of irrationality continued to remain a part of Pakistan’s policy.
• It is important to revisit Pakistan’s 30-year-old strategy to determine why it suddenly felt insecure and hesitant from 2016 onwards.
• The chain of events in Kashmir and part of the Indian counter-strategy, which appeared to unnerve Pakistan’s deep state, need to be reviewed to get the right perspective.

Beginning of the tussle between two countries:

• From 1989 onwards, Pakistan pursued hybrid war as the core of its strategy. Its then ambiguous nuclear status was exploited in the post-Cold War period, when nuclear strategies were in a state of flux.
• Pakistan’s intent was the long-term emasculation of New Delhi’s policy on Jammu and Kashmir and attempt to embarrass India by internationalising the issue — the Simla Agreement’s provision of bilateralism was never respected by Islamabad and Rawalpindi.
• From 1998 onwards, when both nations became overtly nuclear-armed, Pakistan become bolder — Kargil 1999 and the attack on Parliament in 2001 seemed to be based on the assumption that the nuclear overhang had closed the window for an effective conventional Indian response.
• The decision not to cross the LoC in 1999, taken for completely different reasons by the Vajpayee government, and the long standoff of 2002 (Operation Parakram) appeared to substantiate India’s reluctance.
• Seven years later, the Mumbai terror attack, too, made Indian reluctance to execute hot pursuit more evident.

Beginning of the hybrid conflict:

• The nature of the proxy, hybrid conflict started to change from 2013 onwards when a generational transition in local terror content was apparent.
• Burhan Wani and his cohorts were reluctant to listen to, and were less under the control of, elements from across the LoC. As its big ticket capability waned, Pakistan’s deep state panicked.
• In addition, there was a sudden change in the stance of the Indian government in mid-2015. The deep state has never been comfortable with talks and did not support Nawaz Sharif. In 2016, it conducted the Pathankot attack in India’s hinterland and in September that year, the Uri attack close to the LoC. The year ended with the Nagrota terror attack.
• The year 2016 turned out to be decisive and saw a change in the nature and dynamics of hybrid conflict in Jammu and Kashmir.
• The Indian government responded in a graduated way — activity at the LoC increased, followed by the surgical strikes in September 2016 post the Uri attack. The strikes were essentially experimental but provided sufficient inputs to strategise beyond just the tactical level.
• The perception of a lack of Indian response below the nuclear threshold was effectively breached.
  Steps taken by the Government of India:
• In 2016-17, while the deep state succeeded in bringing mobs to the streets, the Indian government was bold about upping the ante in its counter-terrorist strategy.
• The Operation All Out was launched to neutralise attempts at increasing the terror footprint, the less visible but extremely effective measures were those that targeted the Pakistan-sponsored ecosystem.
• This ecosystem comprising a combination of human resources such as over ground workers (OGWs), ideologues and separatists, had permeated the very core of Kashmir.
• Combined with complex financial networks and an effective communication strategy evolved by Pakistan’s Inter State Public Relations (ISPR), it had matured over time.
• It was given space to function by the persistent Indian strategy to primarily count upon physical neutralisation of terror groups, limiting infiltration and preventing fresh local recruitment, which became rife after 2013.
• The Indian National Investigation Agency (NIA) was succeeding in dismantling financial networks and the separatists had become increasingly irrelevant. The Balakot-type response 12 days later was unexpected, but demonstrated political will, military escalation control and a willingness to engage internationally to neutralise Pakistani propaganda.
• The international support that Balakot garnered, the run of military success against terrorist cadres post Pulwama-Balakot and the added political stability at the Centre gave the Indian government the confidence to execute long-awaited political initiatives.

Way forward:

• Pakistan’s attempt to gain greater relevance in Afghanistan through the US and President Donald Trump’s ill-informed offer to mediate on Jammu and Kashmir, acted as triggers for the decisions of August 5, 2019 — to rescind the special constitutional provisions for Jammu and Kashmir.
• Pakistan adopting a more rational course in Jammu and Kashmir and preventing situations which it will clearly be in no position to handle.
• Much depends on the nature of the Afghanistan deal and the extent of Pakistan’s involvement.
• The expectation that the summer of 2020 in Jammu and Kashmir will yet be stable may be right but predictions about Jammu and Kashmir and applying rationality to Pakistan’s actions may not always be the correct approach.
• India must maintain a tight control, prevent the ecosystem’s potential for revamp and remain prepared for all eventualities.
• The summer of 2020 will be a major decider about the future course of the Jammu and Kashmir proxy conflict.

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Prelims Questions:

Q1. With reference to the empowered “Technology Group”, consider the following statements:
1. It will be chaired by the DRDO Chairman.
2. One of the objective is to commercialize of dual use technologies developed in national laboratories and government R&D organizations.

Which of the statements given above is/are correct?
(a) 1 only
(b) 2 only
(c) Both 1 and 2
(d) Neither 1 nor 2

Answer: B
Mains Questions:
Q1. After one year of Balakot operation what are the major developments the relations between two countries. Comment